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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, President Obama assumed office, Democrats assumed
control of Congress, and many assumed that comprehensive health reform
could be signed into law by the end of the year.1 Political opponents and
competing stakeholders alike aspired "to move from a nonsystem to a system of
health care," 2 and finally overcome "the health system's chaotic
disorganization." 3 Whether federal reform should occur had become a given;
debate now centered on how to pursue "the Four Cs" of "coverage, cost control,
coordinated care, and choice." 4 Not surprisingly, though, the always difficult
task of health reform proved even more challenging when competing with
economic recession, rising unemployment, foreign wars, and spiraling deficits
for scarce political and financial capital. Thus, by the 111th Congress' August
2009 recess, early enthusiasm for reform had devolved to distaste for hardand expensive -choices, making it increasingly likely that federal action, if any,
would leave much unresolved.
Whether measured or bold, effective reform must target the causes of the
U.S. "nonsystem" and so far, Congress has paid scant attention to a
fundamental one: ERISA preemption of state law. Since its enactment in 1974,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's preemption language has been
endlessly and inconsistently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Courtsometimes to protect patients, 5 but more often to shield health payers,
particularly managed care organizations, from accountability for their decisions
regarding who will be treated and who will be paid for providing that
treatment. 6 In a nation where most people already receive health coverage
through employer-sponsored benefits plans and many more will do so should
Congress enact an employer mandate, ERISA preemption is a major reason for
a nonsystem that too frequently harms patients, frustrates providers, and
undermines state efforts to impose order on the resulting "chaotic

1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Taps Clinton Ideas but Not Clinton Herself, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2009, at A19 ("Experts say the political climate for passing major health care changes is more
favorable than ever, with business leaders, pharmaceutical and hospital executives, insurance
officials and advocates for patients all agreeing the need is urgent.").
2. Denis Cortese & Jeffrey 0. Korsmo, Health Care Reform: Why We Cannot Afford to Fail, 28
at
available
w173,
w174,
AFFAIRS
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1&disp-type=
(follow
&authorl=cortese&fulltext=health+care+reform&pubdate-year=&volume=&firstpage=
hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
3. Henry J. Aaron, The Pitfalls of Overreachingin Health Reform, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS W184, W185,
at
available
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=l&disp-type=
&authorl=aaron&fulltext='overreaching+in+health+reform&pubdate-year=&volume=&firstpage=
(follow hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
4. Victor R. Fuchs, Health Reform: Getting the EssentialsRight, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS W180, available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=l&disp-type=
&authorl=ffuchs&fulltext=Health+Reform%3A+Getting+the+Essentials+Right&pubdate-year=&vo
lume=&firstpage= (follow hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
5. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 165 and 210 and accompanying text.
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disorganization." 7 Yet, ERISA preemption reform has been virtually absent
from the health reform debate, although it is not clear why. 8 Perhaps this
reflects a pragmatic determination by lawmakers to effect change without
making "perfect the enemy of the absolutely necessary." 9 Perhaps Congress
erroneously views ERISA preemption as no longer being a problem once it
passes individual and/or employer coverage mandates. Or perhaps ERISA's
wider impact on health care is being overlooked or underplayed simply
because it is too complex and confounding to appreciate, let alone fix.
Whatever the reasons, the results are clear: the laudable goal of expanding
coverage will only compound existing problems for patients and providers in
dealing with health care payers. Thus, federal legislators must address ERISA
preemption to ensure managed care accountability to patients and providers.
Clarification of ERISA's preemptive reach is also needed to spell out the role of
states in health care oversight since, with no single payer option on the table,
current reform efforts will inevitably require both federal and state regulation
of health care. 10 This article will clarify why and how to do just that.
The process by which ERISA preemption has deprived patients of their
health benefits, denied providers reimbursement, and derailed too many
promising state efforts to improve the "Four Cs" of "coverage, cost control,
coordinated care, and choice" has been a long and tortured one. This article
begins with the mechanics of ERISA preemption and then examines the
evolution of ERISA's preemptive effect on managed care in particular and
health policy in general. It does so by categorizing an unwieldy body of case
law into seven stages that trace the courts' progression from no preemption of
state law claims against managed care payers, to broad preemption, retreating
to limited preemption and, for now at least, trending again toward broad
preemption.
During the first stage of litigation, health maintenance organizations
[HMOs] were novel entities and lower courts readily adapted theories of direct
and vicarious hospital liability to hold them liable for patient treatment

7. See Aaron, supra note 3.
8. To the extent ERISA reform has been discussed in the context of national health reform, it
has tended to focus on whether self-insured plans will continue to enjoy a lack of governmental
oversight.
See, e.g., Opinion, Repealing ERISA, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574298661486528186.html?mod=google
news-wsj (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
9. Remarks of President Barack Obama, Weekly Address, The White House (Feb. 7, 2009)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog-post/compromisel/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009)
(lauding the Senate for reaching a compromise on his economic recovery plan because "we can't
afford to make perfect the enemy of the absolutely necessary."). President Obama's comment is one
of many variations of a quote attributed to the philosopher Voltaire who stated in his DICTIONAIRE
PHILOSOPi-HIQUE (1764) "[lie mieux est l'ennemi du bien,bien" (translating literally as "the best is the
enemy of the good," but often rephrased as "the perfect is the enemy of the good.").
10. See Alan Weil, A New Approach to the State-FederalRelationship in Health, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS,
at
w188,
w192,
available
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1 &disp-type=
&authorl=weil&fulltext=A+New+Approach+to+the+State=
(follow hyperlink to PDF)
Federal+Relationship+in+Health&pubdate-year=&volume=&firstpage
(last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
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decisions; ERISA preemption was not even raised as a defense." After ERISA
had existed for at least a decade without intersecting with HMO liability claims,
a second stage unfolded. Relying on non-health benefits rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court, creative defense attorneys argued successfully that ERISA
broadly preempted the kinds of HMO liability claims that could be asserted
against hospitals. 12 Judicial struggle characterizes the third and fourth stages as
courts sought to follow the Supreme Court's twists and turns concerning the
scope of ERISA's complete and conflict preemption of state law regarding what
had become known as managed care organizations (MCOs).13
A brief fifth stage saw creative lawyering at work once again, but this time
on behalf of patients. Faced with mounting failures in overcoming ERISA
preemption of state law remedies, the plaintiff's bar invoked ERISA's own civil
enforcement provisions, but the strategy failed when the U.S. Supreme Court
changed course yet again. 14 This portended tighter limits on ERISA preemption
with an attendant expansion of state law remedies, particularly for patient tort
claims arising out of medical necessity determinations.' 5 Sadly for patients,
providers, and state legislators, though, a sixth stage shows the Supreme Court
returning to the expansive ERISA preemption of earlier days. 16 Along the way,
unsustainable increases in health care costs and the uninsured along with
congressional intransigence have incited states to take the lead in expanding
coverage, improving access and controlling costs. Whether ERISA will preempt
such measures is the focus of an emerging seventh stage of judicial
inconsistency that will generate even more confusion unless Congress
implements comprehensive reform and/or loosens the ERISA ties now binding
17
the states.
Collectively these stages reveal that whether Congress enacts
comprehensive reform or moves more incrementally, it must confront ERISA
preemption directly and explicitly recalibrate the roles of federal and state
governments in overseeing health care. Truly comprehensive reform, albeit an
earlier goal that seems increasingly unlikely, might exert so much federal
control as to displace state law entirely. A more likely result would leave state
law intact, at least with regard to individual patient-MCO and/or providerMCO disputes, and perhaps in other respects, too. Consequently, the most
likely result of federal reform or no reform at all is the same: states will
continue to partner with the federal government in regulating health care. And
with or without federal reform, states need greater freedom or at least greater
clarity as to how to operate effectively given the specter of ERISA preemption.
Congress can address this by amending ERISA's preemption provisions and/or
liberalizing the availability of ERISA waivers, but it must not pursue the "Four

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
infra notes 75-153 and accompanying text.
infra notes 145-210 and accompanying text.
infra note 165 and accompanying text.
infra note 211-55 and accompanying text.
infra notes 287-347 and accompanying text.
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Cs" at the expense of patients, providers, and the states. When it comes to
ERISA, its current strategy of saying little and doing less is akin to expecting the
ERISA preemption elephant to leave the room on its own accord. But, as
explained below, thirty five years of litigation demonstrate unequivocally that
this elephant will continue to trample patients and providers, and hamper state
innovation and oversight unless and until Congress shows it the door.
II. DISCUSSION
a. Background and Mechanics of ERISA Preemption
Prior to ERISA's enactment in 1974, states regulated the formation and
administration of employee pension plans in an often complex and frequently
inconsistent manner.' 8 Even well-meaning plan administrators could easily
mismanage a plan in the face of conflicting state directives, and dishonest plan
administrators had ample opportunities to under-fund or misdirect plan assets.
In response, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
197419 to protect employee benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries by
federalizing, and supposedly simplifying, regulation of plan administration.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
Congress intended, "to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to
a uniform body Of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative
and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or
0
between States and the Federal Government." 2
ERISA's content reflects Congress' focus on preventing fraud and
mismanagement in plan administration. 21 As the U.S. Supreme Court has
observed, ERISA "does not go about protecting plan participants and their
beneficiaries by requiring employers to provide any given set of minimum
benefits . . ." 22 Rather, ERISA controls the administration of benefit plans
through its detailed provisions concerning plan design and administration (e.g.,
reporting and disclosure requirements, 23 participation and vesting provisions, 24
funding standards 25 and the fiduciary obligations of plan administrators 26).
Given its purpose of controlling plan administration and its particular focus on

18. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29, 197 (1974) (statements of Sen. Williams that ERISA's
"substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the
field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation of employee benefit plans."); id. (statement of Sen. Dent that preemption "eliminate[s]
the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.").
19. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
20. 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
21. ERISA applies to employee welfare and pension benefit plans that provide "medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits" for plan participants and their beneficiaries "through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
22. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
651 (1995) (hereinafter Travelers).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2006).
24. Id. at §§ 201-211.
25. Id. at §§ 301-308.
26. Id. at §§ 1131-1145.
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pension plans, such detailed directives contrast starkly with its silence about
the complexities of a plan participant's ability to obtain quality health benefits.
To protect plan administrators from the untoward results of unduly
complicated and potentially contradictory state regulations, ERISA also
contains a three-part preemption provision. Section 514(a) states that ERISA
shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
'relate to' an employee benefit plan. .".."27 "Saved" from the so-called "relate
to" clause (or excluded from preemption) are those state laws that qualify, inter
alia, as state insurance law. 28 However, states are precluded from "deeming" a
law to constitute insurance regulation for the purpose of "saving" a law which
would otherwise "relate to" a plan and trigger "relate to" preemption. 29 To
further complicate matters, ERISA does not expressly define "relate to" and
also fails to explain what constitutes state insurance law for the purposes of the
savings and deemer clauses.
Initially, state efforts to invoke saving clause protection to regulate an
emerging managed care industry provided small relief. In Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 30 the Supreme Court looked to its prior
interpretation of similar language in the McCarron-Ferguson Act 3 and held
that, to be saved, a state law would need to regulate "the business of
insurance" 32 which itself needed to (1) transfer or spread the policyholder's
risk, (2) be integral to the insurer-insured relationship, and (3) be limited to
insurance entities. 33 This meant that states could not regulate managed care
entities that share financial risk instead of transferring or spreading risk as
conventional insurers do. Also out of reach were managed care entities acting
as third-party administrators (TPAs) for self-insured plans since self-insurers
do not transfer actuarial risk to an independent entity.
Consistent with expansive preemption, many courts initially interpreted
MetropolitanLife as requiring that all three McCarron-Ferguson factors had to be
satisfied in order to qualify as the kind of state insurance regulation that could
be saved from preemption. 34 Typically, a self-insured plan retains financial risk
even though administrative functions may be delegated to a third party that
may simultaneously serve as an indemnity insurer for other contracts. Thus,
insured and self-insured plans may look virtually identical to plan beneficiaries
since the same "players" may be involved. While subtle, the enormously
significant technicalities of risk transfer mean that only conventionally insured

27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). State
laws subject to possible preemption include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State." Id. at § 1144(c)(1).
28. Id. at § 514(b)(2)(A), § 1444(b)(2)(A).
29. Id. at § 514(b)(2)(B), § 1444(b)(2)(B).
30. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006).
32. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
33. Id. (relying on its prior interpretation of "the business of insurance" in Union Labor Life Ins.
Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), regarding state insurance law's exemption from federal antitrust oversight under the McCarron-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)).
34. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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plans are subject to state insurance regulation while self-insured plans are not. 35
When ERISA was enacted in 1974, self-insurance was seen as appealing only to
large employers. Following 1985's Metropolitan Life decision, however, plans of
all sizes astutely recognized that self-insurance could evade state oversight.
Seeing a growing market, indemnity insurers developed purely administrative
products, making self-insurance feasible even for smaller plans.
Not
surprisingly, the number of self-insured plans quickly grew.
Section 514 preemption of state law and, therefore, state remedies, leave
ERISA's section 502(a) civil enforcement scheme as the sole avenue of relief for
negligent medical necessity and other benefits determinations. Appropriate
relief would normally be found by filing a state tort claim for monetary
damages, but under section 514, this is no longer possible since state tort or
36
legislative relief would not be saved as limited to the business of insurance.
Yet, section 502 only permits equitable relief for obtaining benefits that have
been denied or delayed. Ex ante, this can require a patient to pursue the plan's
administrative appeals process and/or retain an attorney and seek preliminary
injunctive relief while in the midst of a health crisis - a daunting process even
for healthy claimants. Ex post equitable relief for a beneficiary who has suffered
serious harm or death due to a denial or delay in receiving such benefits is
obviously futile. Consequently, ERISA's section 514 preempts state remedies
while section 502(a)(3)'s limited, "other equitable relief" precludes monetary
37
damages even where equitable relief is so clearly hollow.
A state tort remedy may still be available against a defendant (such as a
treating physician) who is not shielded from suit through ERISA preemption.
However, the age of managed care created a new liability scenario in which the
patient and physician are often aligned against a managed care organization
that seeks to block, limit, or change the care deemed medically necessary by the
physician. No longer does a medical malpractice case necessarily pit an injured
patient against an allegedly negligent physician because, in many cases, the
patient has no cause of action against the doctor where the care itself was not
negligently administered. Rather, the harm was rooted not in the quality of
treatment rendered but in an HMO-determined treatment protocol that was not
what the doctor had ordered. Thus, in a medical injury case based on a
managed care (as opposed to a physician's) decision, ERISA preemption of
state law effectively leaves the injuredparty with no remedy.
This result contradicts Congress' original intent of making ERISA an
employee-protective statute. Despite the lack of any indication that Congress
intended to leave patients with no meaningful remedies, recipients of health
benefits through ERISA-qualified plans are cast into the so-called "ERISA

35. To illustrate, statements regarding an individual's health care expenditures may be issued
by Aetna Insurance without the patient ever appreciating whether Aetna is bearing the full financial
risk (and, thus acting as an insurer), or simply acting as a third-party administrator of a separate
self-insured plan.
36. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs, 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (monetary damages
unavailable); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (unavailability of extracontractual, compensatory, or punitive damages under section 502).
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vacuum" of no meaningful remedies and no sensible federal or state
regulations to preclude such plan behavior. 38 In contrast, HMO liability toward
non-ERISA plan enrollees under state law is not compromised by ERISA
preemption. The HMO's accountability under state tort law, therefore, varies
with the ERISA status of the particular plan involved -a result that further
contravenes congressional intent.
ERISA preemption affects managed care in a variety of ways that can be
roughly - very roughly - divided into (1) quality and (2) provider contracting
issues. State quality initiatives that have been preempted include mandated
benefits, grievance requirements, and personal injury actions for HMO
decisions directing or restricting medical care. 39 ERISA has also preempted
state efforts to address provider-contracting issues such as any willing provider
laws, de-selection criteria, and financial incentive and risk-sharing
arrangements (which might also be placed in the quality category due to their
influence on provider behavior and, therefore, patient care), as well as state
40
initiatives to expand coverage.
As a result, quirks in ERISA's structure and text, combined with
inconsistent judicial interpretations have fueled the frustrations of patients,
providers, and state legislators in dealing with managed care. Patients
complain about perceived inadequacies in plan coverage and accountability,
inciting adverse media coverage and litigation. 41 Providers are constrained in
the practice of medicine and often have to fight for reimbursement. 42 In the
meantime, many states have enacted as well as rejected various approaches to
"regulating around" ERISA, but have had little, if any success. 43 Consequently,

38. The earliest judicial mention of this term appears to have occurred in the non-health
benefits case of Gast v. Stevenson, 585 P.2d 12, 22 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). For a more recent example,
see Pichoff v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 556 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2009).
39. For an overview of early ERISA preemption litigation, see Mary Ann Chirba-Martin &
Troyen A. Brennan, The CriticalRole of ERISA in State Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 142 (1994).
40. Id. at 150-52.
41. Managed care denials of medical care have fueled several films, including 2002's "John Q."
a fictional account of a father's desperate efforts to secure coverage for his son's heart transplant,
and Michael Moore's 2007 documentary "Sicko" recounting myriad "HMO horror stories." JOHN
Q. (New Line Cinema 2002); SICKO (Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc. 2007).
ABC News' Good Morning America and similar programs frequently cover such stories as well.
See, e.g., Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, Amputee Fights for Coverage of Prosthetics: GMA Helps
Woman Gets Special Prosthetic Legs After Insurance Company Denied Her, ABC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2009,
availableat http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/GetsAnswers/story?id=6640663&page=l.
See also Lisa Girion, Insurer's Agreement to Cover Surgery Comes Too Late, LA TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/08/business/fi-cigna8; Health Insurer to Be Charged With
Teen's Murder: California Family Will Sue Medical Insurerfor Delaying a Potentially Lifesaving Surgery,
ABC
NEws,
Dec.
21,
2007,
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/CancerPreventionAndTreatment/story?id=4038257&page=1
(reporting on attorney Mark Geragos's promise "to press murder or manslaughter charges" against
Cigna HealthCare because it "'maliciously"' delayed approving a liver transplant for 17-year old
Nataline Sarkisyan). The family's contract and unfair business practices claims were dismissed as
preempted by sections 502 and 514, although their claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress survived. Sarkisyan v. CIGNA Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (C.D. Ca.
2009).
42. See infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 256-93 and 315-16 and accompanying text.
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ERISA, an employee-protective statute, has become the mainstay for relieving
plans of accountability for medical decisions, and has shifted the risk of harm to
the patient/plan participant. Still, in juggling ERISA preemption, one point that
is crucial to hold onto yet is so easily overlooked is that whether a plan is
conventionally or self-insured has no significance for preemption purposes
unless the asserted law or claim first satisfies the "relate to" clause. And it is
precisely at this "starting gate" of ERISA preemption analysis that, in theory,
the greatest gains can be made by the tort litigant or state rule maker. In
practice, however, such possibilities have remained largely unrealized due to
the inherent complexity of ERISA's text, the inconsistency of the U.S. Supreme
Court and other courts charged with its interpretation, and the political
contentiousness of a federal legislative cure.
b. The Stages of HMO Liability and the Phoenix of ERISA Preemption
Stage 1: Parallel Play - HMO Liability and ERISA Preemption Peacefully CoExist
Despite efforts to integrate the finance and delivery of care since the
1930s-the hallmark feature that distinguishes managed care from fee-forservice indemnity insurance -managed care did not capture a significant share
of the employee health insurance market until Congress passed the HMO Act
of 1973. 44 That law sought to promote HMOs by offering financial incentives,
lifting state impediments to HMO formation and enrollment, and requiring
large and mid-size employers providing employee health benefits to offer an
HMO option. 45 Notwithstanding these efforts, managed care did not achieve
its present market dominance until the 1990s. 46
Thus, when Congress debated and ultimately enacted ERISA in 1974,
"employee health benefits" still consisted primarily of traditional
indemnity/fee-for-service insurance. The ensuing permutations of integrating
health care finance and delivery, the on-going development of cost control
strategies that influence if not dictate the provision of health care, and the
predominance of employer sponsorship of health benefits were simply too
embryonic to influence Congress' design of ERISA in 1974. 47

If anything,

enacting ERISA and the HMO Act in the same time frame shows that Congress

44. Federal HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1973). For an overview of the history of
managed care before and after passage of the HMO Act, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural
Protectionsfor Patients in CapitatedHealth Plans, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, passim (1996).

45. 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1973).
46. In 1970, just 37 HMOs existed in fourteen (mostly western) states with enrollment totaling
three million. Due to increased federal funding, looser federal requirements and structural
diversification, HMOs neared 500 in number and twenty-five million in enrollment by 1987. Lynn
R. Gruber, Maureen Shadle, & Cynthia L. Polich, From Movement to Industry: The Growth of HMOs, 7
HEALTH AFFAIRS 197, 197-99, 201 (1988). See also, Gail A. Jensen, et al., The New Dominance of
Managed Care: Insurance Trends In The 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 125, 134 (1997) (reporting that by
1997, approximately 75% of employer-sponsored health coverage was provided through managed
care plans).
47. See Gruber et al., supra note 46.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 36:91

intended HMOs to be subject to the same oversight that states traditionally
exercise over health care issues in general and health insurance in particular.
In the first decade following its enactment, litigants apparently thought so,
too, as ERISA's section 502 civil enforcement remedies and section 514's "relate
to" preemption clause peacefully co-existed with both the application of state
law and the emerging industry of managed health care. In the earliest stage of
managed care litigation, ERISA preemption was not even raised as a defense to
state liability claims against HMOs or independent utilization reviewers for
medical necessity determinations resulting in patient harm. 48 For example, the
1986 decision of Wickline v. State of Californiarecognized the viability of a claim
for an HMO's negligent utilization review even though the facts did not
support liability in that case. 49 Two years later, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court ruled in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center that an HMO may be
vicariously liable for medical malpractice through ostensible agency where the
patient looks primarily to the HMO for care. 50 In the 1990 case of Wilson v. Blue
Cross of Southern California, a claim for negligent utilization review was again
permitted where utilization review denied coverage for an extended psychiatric
hospitalization even though the treating physician deemed it medically
necessary; the patient was discharged and committed suicide a few days later.51
The court reasoned that there was no reason, public policy or otherwise, to
exempt a utilization review company from tort liability where its actions
otherwise satisfied the elements of a negligence claim. 52
In applying conventional tort principles to the relatively novel entities of
HMOs, UR companies, and other managed care organizations, the early state
court opinions did not even mention ERISA preemption. Importing hospital
liability principles into the managed care context was just a typical example of
how existing law evolves to address novel issues. In fact, in some ways, the
case for HMO liability based on ostensible agency theories seemed to be on
even firmer ground than hospital vicarious liability. While a hospital often has
no relationship with a patient prior to that patient's entry, an HMO might enjoy
years of a formal contractual relationship coupled with explicit documentary
assertions of "caring" for the patient in the most literal sense of the word.
Nevertheless, despite the common sense appeal of holding HMOs to the same
theories of institutional liability that govern other health care entities, this first
stage of HMO liability litigation soon drew to a close when defendants reached
back to a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court case that approved the use of an ERISA
preemption defense in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,5 3 and in so doing, unleashed
the proverbial floodgate of litigation that has entangled state law ever since.
Stage 2: The Schoolyard Bully - Broad "Relate to" Preemption Trumps State

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
547 A.2d 1229,1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 884.
463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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Law
By the early 1980's, managed care was becoming the common mode of
financing and delivering health benefits especially given relentless cost inflation
since HMOs tended to achieve at least initial cost savings when switching from
fee-for-service plans. 54 Consistent with the 1973 HMO Act's directive that
states could continue to regulate HMOs, states passed a variety of laws in
response to managed care's growing market penetration. 55 For a time, it
seemed that HMO beneficiaries would enjoy the same rights and protections
accorded those who were conventionally insured. This quickly passed, though,
once the innovative defense of ERISA section 514 "relate to" preemption
protected the managed care industry from the reach of state regulators and
individual litigants alike.
This truly seismic shift was triggered by U.S. Supreme Court cases that had
nothing to do with health benefits. Basically, the Court accorded 514
preemption such a broad sweep that the statute seemed to displace almost any
kind of state law. Interpreting section 514 in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the
Court stated that a state law will "relate to" a plan and be preempted "if it has a
connection with or reference to" an ERISA qualified benefit plan-as long as
such claims were not "too tenuous." 56 This broad and amorphous definition
was soon invoked by a variety of defendants to evade all kinds of state laws on
the ground that they had a "reference to" or were "connected with" an
employee benefit plan. 7
Thus, after over a decade of peaceful co-existence, ERISA now routinely
preempted state laws simply because a benefits plan appeared somewhere in
the case's fact scenario. 58 This derailed state efforts to regulate a burgeoning
managed care industry even though ERISA itself provided virtually no
substantive regulation of employee health benefits. "The ERISA vacuum" of
regulation grew as state efforts to regulate managed care through any willing
provider,5 9 or health care financing laws 60 fell to "relate to" preemption. Such

54. See Humphrey Taylor & Michael Kagay, The HMO Report Card: A Closer Look, 5 HEALTH
AFFAiRs 81, 84-85 (1986).
55. See generally Fred J. Hellinger, Any-Willing-Providerand Freedom of-Choice Laws: An Economic
Assessment, 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS 297, 298 (1995).
56. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (1983).
57. See, e.g., id. at 97-98 (1983) ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Employing this
definition, the [New York] Human Rights Law, which prohibits employers from structuring their
employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability
Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate to' benefit
plans.") (footnotes omitted).
58. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-54 (1986) (preemption of suits
alleging improper claims processing).
59. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 800 F. Supp. 328, 334-35 (E.D.Va.
1992), vacated and remanded, 995 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1993) (District Court found that Virginia
statute regarding HMO contracting with preferred provider organizations triggered "relate to"
preemption since it regulated PPOs but did not qualify for saving clause protection. Appeals Court
reversed, reasoning that the law did relate to a plan, but qualified as state insurance regulation
saved from preemption); Koch v. Mork Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (relate to
preemption of state collateral source rule).
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successes led HMOs to assert preemption as a defense to almost any and all
obligations imposed by state statutory or common law. Nowhere was this
literally more painful than in cases where an injured patient (or his estate)
attempted to hold an HMO liable for a decision affecting medical treatment.
The seemingly straightforward application of existent tort principles to
managed care that began in Wickline and Wilson, 6a had hit a dead end. Patients
were left with no redress for harm resulting from an HMO's denial of care,
providers had limited ability to enforce reimbursement contracts, and states
were severely restricted in addressing HMO practices or more generalized
health care issues.
One of the earliest-and most troubling -examples
of "relate to"
preemption's impact on patient care occurred in the 1992 case of Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc. 62 Blue Cross served as third party administrator for a
self-insured employee health benefits plan and contracted with United
HealthCare ("UHC") to administer the plan's "Quality Care" or utilization
review program. 6 3 UHC would assure delivery of "the most appropriate
medical care" while eliminating "medically unnecessary treatment" along with
64
the attendant financial costs and other risks of such treatment.
Plaintiff's obstetrician determined that the appropriate medical care for his
patient, a woman in the third trimester of a high-risk pregnancy, was roundthe-clock fetal monitoring in an acute care setting. 65 Only by providing
monitoring under these circumstances, he reasoned, would it be possible to
detect fetal distress and intervene immediately. UHC disagreed, but did
approve 10 hours of at-home fetal monitoring by a visiting nurse. Despite the
efforts of the physician and his patient to secure more comprehensive care,
UHC would only approve coverage for a treatment protocol that not only
deviated from the physician's recommendation, but also defied common sense.
Authorizing 10 hours of daily monitoring acknowledged the need for fetal
monitoring. Yet, the protocol presumed that a fetus could somehow appreciate
when it was being monitored, and confine any displays of distress to that
period. Tragically, the fetus died while off-monitor. 66 The family brought a
wrongful death action in state court against Blue Cross and UHC for UHC's
negligent medical decision to deny hospitalization and constant fetal
monitoring.67 They did not sue the obstetrician because he had vigorously
advocated for inpatient care. 68

60. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom N.Y. State
Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (Court of
Appeals found ERISA's relate to clause preempted New York hospital surcharge statute due to
economic impact on ERISA plans). For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal, see infra at
notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
62. 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 1323.
64. Id. (quoting plan documents).
65. Id. at 1322-23.
66. Id. at 1324.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1324-25. Defendants asserted both section 514's "relate to" preemption and diversity
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that UHC had made "a medical
recommendation which - because of the financial ramifications - is more likely
to be followed." 69 However, since the allegedly negligent medical decision was
part of "handling a benefit determination" it impermissibly related to a plan
and thus was section 514 preempted. 70 This sad but, in the court's view,
unavoidable result was not altered by "the traditional or non-traditional nature
of the state law" involved 71 or the probability that Congress "could not have
predicted" how ERISA preemption could affect utilization review decisions. 72
This effectively constructed a strong presumption in favor of preemption while
denying plaintiffs any meaningful relief.
A year later, in the 1993 decision of Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of
Kansas City, Inc., 73 section 514 was found to preempt a medical malpractice
challenge to a plan's seven-month delay in approving payment for an employee
beneficiary's heart surgery. Although the plan ultimately reversed its initial
denial of coverage, the patient's health had so seriously declined by then that he
was no longer a candidate for the procedure and he died. In the same year,
Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 74 reached a similar result when it held that ERISA's
broad "relate to" clause preempted a claim against an HMO for its refusal to
approve a bone marrow transplant for a cancer patient. Now, Corcoran's
presumption in favor of broad "relate to" preemption was becoming an
increasingly impermeable shield, rendering state tort liability essentially
meaningless for patients who had been harmed by their HMO's growing
involvement in medical decision-making.
Stage 3: Timeout - A Gradual Return to Traditional Preemption Analysis
Intercepts ERISA's Reach
In addition to eviscerating state tort law, preemption similarly derailed
state regulatory efforts to rein in health care cost inflation and cross-subsidize
uncompensated care. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo,75 for example, struck
down a New York hospital rate setting statute that required hospitals to impose
a series of surcharges on the bills of patients who were covered by commercial
payers. 76 Although the statute said nothing about ERISA benefit plans, it was
successfully defeated on the ground that the statute impermissibly related to a
plan by imposing indirect economic costs on it. 77 Faced with a similar

as grounds for removal. The court stated that a "relate to" preemption defense would have been
independently sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 1325, n.4 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)).
69. Id. at 1332.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1333-34.
72. Id. at 1334.
73. 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993).
74. 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. 14 F.3d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom N.Y. Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). See infra, note 83 and accompanying text.
76. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 2807-C (McKinney 1993).
77. Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 718.
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challenge to a similar New Jersey law, though, the Third Circuit broke ranks in
United Wire, Metal, and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital when it found that such broad preemption violated ERISA's
underlying intent. 78 It reasoned that a state law does not "relate to" a plan
unless it specifically targets, or creates rights or restrictions predicated on the
existence of such plans.79 As conceptualized by the Third Circuit, a successful
section 514 defense would need to show not only that the law had an effect on
plans, but also that the effect created the type of interference with plan
administration that Congress intended to preempt.
Since most courts continued to find broad "relate to" preemption, United
Wire remained an outlier until 1995 when the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari 80 to resolve the conflict between the hospital rate setting rulings of the
Second Circuit in Travelers v. Cuomo81 and the Third Circuit in United Wire.82 In
ruling against preemption, 83 it could have adopted the United Wire test-that
only laws that specifically target or predicate rights and restrictions on the
existence of ERISA plans are "relate to" preempted8 4 Instead, it chose to return
to a conventional preemption analysis in order to clarify what was becoming an
increasingly confusing area of the law. Critiquing section 514's structural
complexity and textual ambiguity 85 it also acknowledged that its past rulings
had further complicated matters. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to
spell out the mechanics of "relate to" analysis, beginning with "a starting
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law" 86 particularly
87
in areas traditionally left to state control.
The Court stated unequivocally that such laws are preempted only if it is
"the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 88 State laws that expressly
reference an ERISA plan directly conflict with ERISA's text and thus are
preempted by section 514.89 In Travelers, though, there was no "reference" since
the New York statute did not mention ERISA plans. To determine whether it
had a sufficient "connection" with ERISA plans, the Court needed to "go
beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term,
and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of

78. 995 F.2d 1179, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), reversing 793 F. Supp. 524, 542 (D.N.J. 1992).
79. Id. at 1192.
80. 513 U.S. 920 (1994).
81. 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1994).
82. 995 F.2d 1179, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995). That the issue had great importance beyond these two cases was
evidenced by the amici curiae briefs filed separately by a dozen states and the National Governor's
Association in support of upholding the New York statute, along with a variety of large trade
groups such as the Group Health Association of America, Inc. and the Federation of American
Health Systems, which favored preempting it.
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. It observed: "[if] 'relate to' were taken to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for
all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for '[rleally, universally, relations
stop nowhere." 514 U.S. at 655.
86. Id. at 654-55 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
87. Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 655.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 656.
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the state law that Congress understood would survive." 90 That ERISA was
intended to secure "nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans" did not negate the presumption against preemption here because the
rate setting law fell within the state's traditional area of health care oversight.91
What Congress did intend was to protect plan administrators from inconsistent
and interfering state regulations, and thus must have intended "relate to" to
displace those state laws which would overtly or effectively regulate actual
plan administration. Accordingly, section 514 preempts laws that directly
mandate or indirectly bind the choices of plan administrators or otherwise
interfere with uniform plan administration. 92 The New York surcharge statute,
however, only imposed an indirect economic cost on plans, which could
affect - but would not bind - the plans' "shopping decisions" concerning the
administration and delivery of benefits. 93 The Court could find no evidence
that "Congress chose to displace [such] general health care regulation, which
historically has been a matter of local concern" 94 especially since such measures
existed when ERISA was enacted. 95 As a result, the New York's rate setting law
96
would remain in effect.
The Supreme Court's more conventional and restrictive approach to "relate
to" preemption continued in CaliforniaDivision of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham, where it rejected ERISA preemption of a state labor law, and again
emphasized that courts must presume that Congress would not override state
police powers absent clear evidence of an intent to do so. 97 In DeBuono v.
NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Service Fund98 where it found that a state tax on
both ERISA-funded and non-ERISA funded health care providers was simply
"one of 'a myriad state laws' of general applicability that impose[d] some
burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless [did] not 'relate
to' them within the meaning of the statute." 99 For a short time, the TravelersDillingham-DeBuonotrilogy encouraged state legislators, providers, and patients
to believe that: (1) courts were now better equipped to resolve "relate to"
preemption challenges with consistency and predictability; and (2) managed
care organizations could no longer use section 514 to evade their
responsibilities under state law. But it was only for a short time.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661 (citations omitted).
Id. at 665.
Id. at 668.
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997).
Id. at 815.
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Stage 4: [Complete vs. Conflict Preemption] + [Quality vs. Quantity] = Dazed &
Confused
The plaintiff's bar enthusiastically embraced Travelers, believing that
negligence claims for medical decision making would now survive preemption
since common law negligence is even more traditionally "state" than hospital
rate setting statutes. However, Travelers' apparent restriction of section 514
"conflict" preemption regarding state oversight of "quality" catalyzed a shift to
section 502 "complete" preemption of a plan's "quantity" or coverage
determinations. It soon became apparent that the Supreme Court's attempt to
forge a clear path through the minefield of section 514 preemption ironically
had only made things worse.
The confusion began a month later when the Third Circuit rejected section
502 complete preemption of medical decision making claims in Dukes v. United
States Healthcare, Inc.100 Previously, removing state tort claims to federal court
on section 514 conflict preemption grounds happened routinely.10 1 The federal
district court typically dismissed the removed claims as section 514 preempted
because "the treatment received must be measured against the benefit plan"
and, for an ERISA plan, such claims necessarily related to that plan. 10 2 Once
again, though, the Third Circuit saw things quite differently, this time by
finding no section 514 removal jurisdiction.
To remove a state claim to federal court, the defendant bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction.10 3 Under the "well-pleaded complaint rule,"
the federal district court should confine itself to the face of the complaint in
determining whether federal jurisdiction exists.l14 A state claim normally will
not support federal jurisdiction unless Congress intended federal law to
supplant it. Such instances of "complete" preemption -which include ERISA's
section 502 -create federal question jurisdiction and allow removal from state
to federal court.1 05 Before Dukes, HMOs had routinely used section 514 to
remove state cases to federal courts, 10 6 but now, the Third Circuit reasoned that
section 514's "relate to" clause involved conflict rather than complete
preemption and thus did not confer federal question jurisdiction. Complete
preemption under section 502's civil enforcement provisions would have

100. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995). The decision overruled the consolidated cases of Dukes v. U.S.
Health Care Sys. Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) which had asserted a wrongful death case
against an HMO for its failure to perform certain blood tests, and Visconti v. U.S. Health Care Sys.,
Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) which concerned direct and vicarious liability claims for
negligence in selecting providers and delivering care.
101. See, e.g., Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1331 (discussed supra note 62); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO,
844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
102. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 351. Remaining claims were then remanded to state court. Dukes, 848 F.
Supp. at 42.
103. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(a). The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that removal
statutes do not create independent grounds for federal jurisdiction and should be strictly construed.
See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
104. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983).
105. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
106. See, e.g., Corcoran, discussed supranote 62 and accompanying text.
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107

supported removal had plaintiffs complained of improper withholding or
processing of plan benefits. 107 A section 514 conflict preemption defense to a
state law claim would not create federal jurisdiction because state courts are
just as qualified as their federal counterparts to resolve conflict preemption
disputes.
The case could have ended there, but the Third Circuit went on in dicta to
untangle the "quality" and "quantity" components of managed care decisions
despite the Fifth Circuit's belief in Corcoran that the two were inseparable.
Rather than criticize Corcoran for improperly finding "relate to" preemption of
an essentially medical and, therefore, quality decision, 10 8 the Dukes court stated
that contesting the prospective utilization review in Corcoran amounted to a
completely preempted challenge to a section 502 benefits determination. In
contrast, Dukes involved claims of negligent provision of care, not improper
claims processing or benefits determinations. This distinction was a bit too
facile since even Corcoran conceded that the HMO decisions being challenged
Nevertheless, the Dukes court concluded that a
were medical ones. 1° 9
preemption challenge to the medical claims before it could only be grounded in
section 514's "relate to" clause and, therefore, belonged in state court absent
independent grounds for federal jurisdiction.
Coming so soon after Travelers' renewed regard for state oversight of health
care quality issues, Dukes' bright line distinctions between section 514 vs.
section 502 preemption, and "quality" vs. "quantity," had a huge and
immediate impact on ERISA jurisprudence. 110 In theory, the courts seemed
poised to retreat from Corcoran and return to the early Wickline days when a UR
decision to override or delay care might be actionable under state negligence
law." 1 In reality, the Travelers' and Dukes' efforts at analytical clarity unleashed
a deluge of inconsistent opinions as the bright line devolved to a blur.
An early example was Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. in which both
section 502 and section 514 blocked claims against an HMO and its UR nurse
1 2
for failing to authorize physical therapy following knee surgery. 1 Because the
nurse was administering the plan, section 502 completely preempted the
negligence claim against her as well as the vicarious liability claim against the
HMO for her UR decision." 3 In the court's view:
[T]he preemptive force of ERISA is so powerful that it converts "a

107. In that instance, equitable relief under § 502(a) to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify
future rights under the terms of the plan would still be available after exhausting administrative
remedies under the plan (even though equitable or declaratory relief is often futile post-injury). See
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Turner v. Fallon Comty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 198 (1st Cir. 1997);
Belanger v. Healthsource of Me., 66 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D.Me. 1999).
108. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
109. Compare discussion of Corcoran's treatment of medical decision making, supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
110. 57 F.3d at 361.
111. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
112. 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1485.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 36:91

state law claim into an action arising under federal law,"114 even if the
plaintiff does not want relief under ERISA. [citation omitted] This is
true even though the same facts might be sufficient to state a state law
cause of action for negligence. 115
In addition, section 514 preempted vicarious liability claims against the
HMO for the treating physician's negligent treatment because, in actuality, the
11 6
claims were rooted in the failure to treat due to the plan's denial of benefits.
Consequently, plaintiff would have to look to section 502 for equitable relief
117
even if it offered too little too late.
At this time, Dukes still seemed to be on solid ground since, having decided
the Travelers-Dillingham-DeBuonotrilogy, the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in
Boggs v. Boggs continued to underscore its return to traditional preemption
analysis-and attendant respect for the preeminence of state law in certain
contexts. 1 8 While not a health benefits case, the 5-4 Boggs decision is notable
since both the majority and dissent reduced a potentially complex "relate to"
challenge of a Louisiana testamentary transfer statute1 19 to a simple inquiry into
whether Congress intended ERISA to supplant this type of state law. The
majority found section 514 preemption due to a "direct clash" between ERISA
and the Louisiana provision. 120 Maintaining Travelers' focus on congressional
intent, the dissent found no preemption given no evidence that Congress
intended to preempt the traditionally state-regulated issues of domestic
relations and community property law that were at the core of the case. 121
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's seemingly restrictive view of
preemption, the lower courts continued to struggle - and differ - in
distinguishing quality from quantity and section 502 from section 514 in Turner
v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc.122 and Bast v. Prudential Insurance Company
of America. 123 Each case sought damages for the death of a spouse allegedly
caused by the plan's refusal to approve an autologous bone marrow transplant.
Denial of coverage was based on the plan-wide package of benefits - what

114. Id. at 1490 (quoting Metro. Life Insur. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)).
115. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 66-67).
116. Id. at 1493-94.
117. Id. at 1495.
118. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
119. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 535 (2008). The law permitted a non-plan participating spouse to
make a testamentary transfer of her interest in her husband's undistributed pension plan benefits.
A man's first wife predeceased him and bequeathed her interest to her sons. He remarried and,
upon his death, his new wife claimed his retirement benefits. The sons from his first marriage
contested this, claiming that those benefits were theirs by virtue of their mother's prior testamentary
transfer under the Louisiana statute. The second wife argued that section 514 preempted the law
and a 5-4 majority agreed. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 873-74.

The Court's fealty to Travelers was again demonstrated in Unum Life
Insurance Company of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1999), which unanimously ruled that
California's notice-prejudice rule was saved from ERISA preemption despite conflicting with
ERISA's substantive provisions since disuniformities are the inevitable result of Congress' intent to
save insurance regulation from relate to preemption.
122. 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997).
123. 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Dukes would characterize as administrative determinations regarding the
"quantum of benefits" - rather than denying or delaying a covered benefit for a
particular patient as occurred in Dukes and Corcoran. Turner and Bast agreed
that ERISA preempted plaintiffs' claims, but differed as to why and how. In
Turner, the First Circuit found that section 502 completely preempted damage
claims because the plan documents excluded the treatment as unproven for
solid tumors. Accordingly, relief could only be obtained through section 502
even though its focus on equitable relief provided no meaningful remedies. 24
In Bast, the Ninth Circuit also found preemption - but this time under section
514's "relate to" clause. 125 Even though purely equitable relief has little
meaning after a patient's death, the court also rejected plaintiff's argument that
126
damages should be available under section 502's civil enforcement remedies.
27
At the same time, a completely different result obtained in Pappas v. Asbe11
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied preemption of a state medical
malpractice challenge to an HMO's delay in authorizing an emergency hospital
transfer. 128 The trial court had found section 514 preemption since the transfer
delay was an administrative decision. 29 The intermediate appeals court
reversed, explaining that negligence law is a form of state oversight in matters
of health quality 130 which, at most, has only an indirect economic impact that
survives preemption under Travelers.31 The state supreme court affirmed,
reasoning that the transfer delay was "indisputably [I intertwined with the
provision of safe medical care" and Congress never intended "to preempt state
132
It
laws concerning the regulation of the provision of safe medical care."
nevertheless recognized the quantity implications of denying transfer to a
particular hospital, acknowledging "there will be a financial impact on HMOs.
Yet, that is not enough to countermand the conclusion that these claims are not
preempted." 133 For the Pappas court, the enmeshed quality and administrative

124. 127 F.3d at 199.
125. 150 F.3d at 1008.
126. Id. at 1010.
127. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998).
128. After receiving steroid injections for neck and shoulder pain from his internist, Mr. Pappas
experienced numbness in his chest, abdomen, and limbs and could not walk. At the community
hospital ER, Dr. Asbel detected a cervical epidural abscess compressing the spinal cord which
warranted immediate transfer to Jefferson Hospital's spinal cord trauma unit. The HMO denied
authorization for a transfer to Jefferson, but approved transfer to three other hospitals. Dr. Asbel
and the community hospital's neurosurgeon made several requests to speak with the HMO
physician, but they were only permitted to speak with the HMO's administrative personnel. Mr.
Pappas was ultimately transported to the Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital, but he became
paralyzed. In addition to malpractice claims against Asbel and the community hospital, Pappas
sued his HMO, claiming that "negligence in causing an inordinate delay in transferring him to a
facility equipped and immediately able to address the neurological emergency" exacerbated the
spinal compression, and resulted in quadriplegia. 675 A.2d 711, 713-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 169 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988)).
131. Id. at 171-72.
132. Pappas, 724 A.2d at 893.
133. Id. at 894. In addition, disputing the lower court's contention that Congress could not have
intended ERISA to preempt challenges to HMO cost-containment, it observed that enacting the
Federal HMO Act just one year before ERISA showed that Congress did indeed understand
managed care. Id. at 893.
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aspects of a plaintiff's claim were not enough to warrant section 514
preemption, although many courts had already disagreed.
Cases such as Turner, Bast, and Pappas showed just how important judicial
characterization of a claim had become to the ultimate resolution of an ERISA
preemption challenge. Increasingly, surviving complete and/or conflict
preemption now required winning the battle of semantics. This reflected the
deeper problem of expecting black and white labels to capture so many shades
of gray. Despite its conceptual appeal, the Dukes approach of bifurcating
"quality" from "quantity," and "medical" from "administrative" decisions is
often too difficult to implement in a given fact scenario. 1M
The limits of Dukes's quality versus quantity and section 502 versus section
514 distinctions are highlighted in Danca v. Private Health Care Systems, Inc.
involving pre-certification of psychiatric hospitalization, but denial of the
particular hospital and program requested. 135 After being treated at the
approved hospital, the plaintiff patient was released, attempted suicide by drug
overdose, was re-hospitalized at another facility, and again attempted suicide this time by self-immolation which disfigured over 45% of her body and
destroyed the fingers on both hands. 136 The case was removed to federal
district court where plaintiff argued that her negligent pre-certification claim
went to the quality of benefits delivered since treatment was not denied
outright; defendants countered that choosing a specific hospital was precisely
the kind of administrative decision that Congress intended to protect through
preemption.137 The district court found section 514 preemption because
challenging a benefits determination impermissibly relates to plan
administration. 138 The First Circuit preempted under both section 502 and
section 514. In its view, "quasi-medical" UR decisions are "indisputably" part
of benefits determinations, 139 making a negligence challenge a section 502
preempted alternative enforcement mechanism and a section 514 conflicting
state law. 140
In contrast to Danca's refusal to recognize HMO negligence, the Third

134. See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003) (state tort claim based on mixed eligibility
decisions not completely preempted).
135. 185 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). The plaintiff had a long history of mental illness, was acutely
psychotic, and her physician recommended that she be admitted to McLean Hospital where she had
been treated successfully in the past. The utilization reviewer denied this request and pre-certified
her for Emerson Hospital, which did not offer the particular therapy available at McLean. Id. at 3.
136. Id. at 2-4. See also Danca v. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Mass. 1998).
137. Danca,9 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32.
138. Id. The federal district judge urged patients to be more proactive in invoking section 502's
civil enforcement provisions if initially displeased with a plan's refusal to comply with the treating
physician's determination of medical necessity. In doing so, the judge showed little appreciation
for the logistical difficulties of, and disincentives to mounting a legal challenge in the midst of an
urgent medical situation where the law itself poses little likelihood of success given its limitation of
remedies and standard of judicial deference to plan decisions.
139. Danca, 185 F.3d at 5-6 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 17. Further examples of an HMO's individual treatment decisions triggering either
section 502 and/or section 514 preemption are numerous and include Tolton v. America Biodyne,
Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (section 514 preemption of state claims based on HMO's denial of
inpatient care to suicidal patient); Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137
(E.D. Va. 1997) (section 502 preemption of negligence claims regarding referrals and testing).
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Circuit in Bauman v. U.S. Healthcarepermitted a negligence challenge to a plan's
maternity length of stay policy since it affected quality of care. 141 It explained
that, independent of its administrative tasks (such as accounting and record
keeping), 142 a plan acts as a "a health care provider" in arranging and
delivering medical treatment "directly or through contracts with hospitals,
doctors, or nurses."1 43 Thus, section 502 completely preempts claims that seek
to enforce or clarify benefits due, but not "state-law claims directed to the
quality of benefits provided."144 Challenging the quality of care instead of the
quantum of benefits rested on "the HMO's essentially medical determination of
the appropriate level of care" 145 and therefore survived section 502 complete
46
preemption.1
Patients were not just concerned about managed care's quasi-medical role
in authorizing care; they also challenged the use of financial decisions to
influence provider decisions regarding diagnostic testing, treatment, and
referrals. These were harder cases since financial incentives were at least
facially the kind of administrative decision protected by preemption. Yet, some
courts found that even these can survive complete and conflict preemption
when sufficiently integrated with the quality of care provided. In Stewart v.
Berry Family Health Center,1 47 for example, section 502 did not completely
preempt a claim that the HMO's "financial incentives and cost control systems
were the direct and proximate cause" of inadequate diagnosis and treatment. 148
The court stated that the claim's "proper characterization.., is highly
important" 149 because section 502 does not preempt a claim for wrongful denial
of benefits. 150 Instead, financial incentives that allegedly "affected the standard
of care," 15 are "more properly characterized as challenging a [non-section 502
preempted] medical decision to deny proper treatment to a patient rather than

141. 193 F.3d at 156-57. Future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the
Lancastercourt's reflection that the "most significant contribution" of its prior decision in Dukes was
its distinction between the quality and quantum of benefits. Id. at 161-62 (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at
357-58).
142. "As an administrator overseeing an ERISA plan, an HMO will have administrative
responsibilities over the elements of the plan, including determining eligibility for benefits,
calculating those benefits, disbursing them to the participant, monitoring available funds, and
keeping records. As we held in Dukes, claims that fall within the essence of the administrator's
activities in this regard fall within section 502(a)(1)(B) and are completely preempted." Id. at 162.
143. Id. (citing both Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361, and Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1329-34, for the point that
HMOs act as both health care providers and plan administrators).
144. Id. at 161-62 (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356).
145. Id. at 163.
146. Id. at 164; accord Crum v. Health-Alliance Midwest, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (C.D. 111.
1999) (plan's policy of requiring pre-approval from an advisory nurse before using the emergency
room was sufficiently medical in nature to constitute the kind of quality claim that survives
preemption). See also Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996); Smith v. HMO
Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. II. 1994).
147. 105 F. Supp. 2d 807 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
148. Id. at 811.
149. Id. at 812.
150. Id. at 815.
151. Id. at 813.
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an administrative decision to deny benefits." 15 2 Plus, there was no section 514
"relate to" preemption as the HMO-provider relationship "does not rest upon
the terms of the plan... " 153
That patients prevailed in Stewart, Pappas and the Third Circuit's cases only
compounded the unpredictability of deciding whether and how to litigate these
claims. In other jurisdictions, most patients lost and increasingly did because of
section 502. There had to be a better way to enforce patients' rights if ERISA
was going to render so many kinds of state laws inoperative. And in Stage
Five, the plaintiffs' bar was about to look for it by reasoning that, if ERISA truly
supplanted all state claims, then ERISA's own civil enforcement scheme must
provide some sort of redress to those injured by an HMO's decision. Although
this tactic ultimately failed, it launched a renewed respect for state law. But this
too, did not last long.
Stage 5: Offense as Defense - Seeking ERISA Remedies as an End-Run Around
Preemption.
Since HMOs had enjoyed so much success in using complete and conflict
preemption to avoid state jurisdiction and evade liability under state common
and statutory law, patients decided to look to ERISA itself for relief. One
strategy was to focus on an HMO's use of financial incentives and UR practices
to reduce treatments and referrals. The U.S. Supreme Court appeared to light
the way in its 1996 holding in Varity Corp. v. Howe' 54 that breach of fiduciary
obligation claims are actionable under section 502(a)(3)'s provision for "other
156
155
equitable relief," and its 1999 decision in Humana Inc. v. Forsyth that RICO
actions could be brought against insurance companies. At the same time, a
well-organized group of plaintiffs' attorneys were winding down their lucrative
state Medicaid reimbursement litigation against the tobacco industry. Flush
with cash and primed with experience in using class-action litigation to
circumvent evidentiary problems of individual causation, they turned their
157
attention and resources to holding HMOs accountable for patient harms.
The self-described "REPAIR" team'5 8 and like-minded litigants asserted a
variety of claims, including RICO violations and breach of ERISA fiduciary
obligations, based on the HMOs' inadequate disclosure of the impact of
financial incentives and other cost control techniques on the delivery of quality
health care. RICO's promise as an alternative basis for relief was short-lived
when Maio v. Aetna, Inc. rejected claims that Aetna violated RICO by
fraudulently advertising its commitment to quality health care when it was

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
J., Sept.
158.

Id. at 815.
Id.
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
525 U.S. 299, 311 (1999).
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (2006).
See, e.g., Laurie McGinley & Milo Geyelin, Attorneys Prepare Suits Against HMOs, WALL ST.
30,1999, at A3.
Id.
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assurance
quality
to fiscal constraints. l5 9Aetna's
instead devoted
advertisements were deemed obvious puffery that could not support a fraud
count. 160 Plus, any injury was "too hypothetical" and unsupported by a
showing of proximate cause. 161
Claiming breach of ERISA disclosure obligations produced mixed results.
Drolet v. Healthsource recognized an ERISA-imposed fiduciary obligation to
inform patients of physicians' financial incentives to contain treatment and
referrals in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. 162 In Shea v. Esensten, the
Eighth Circuit recognized a similar duty resulting in the settlement of several
claims. 163 In contrast, Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare,Inc. found no ERISA fiduciary
obligation to disclose financial incentives. 164
Weiss foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court's 2000 death knell to using
section 502 remedies to circumvent preemption problems in Pegram v.
Herdrich.65 There, the patient claimed that her physician-owned HMO's
financial incentive plan induced physicians to provide less care than medically
necessary in breach of ERISA's fiduciary obligations-in this case, a delayed
ultrasound that led to a ruptured appendix. 166 Thus, the Pegram Court had to
decide whether treatment decisions made by an HMO acting through its
treating physicians are fiduciary acts under ERISA. 167 Ruling that such "mixed
169
"16
it
treatment and eligibility decisions 8 are not fiduciary in nature,
effectively found that ERISA itself would continue to provide little help in
filling the gap caused by sections 502 and 514 preemption of state remedies.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter acknowledged that under
both fee-for-service medicine and managed care, physicians face financial
incentives that influence their treatment decisions. 170 An "inducement to
ration"' 7 ' is an inevitable feature of any risk-bearing managed care plan but

159. No. 99-1969, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15056, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999).
160. Id.
161. Id. at *7.
162. 968 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D.N.H. 1997).
163. 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
164. 972 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
165. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
166. Mrs. Herdrich sought treatment from Lori Pegram, M.D., a Carle physician, for abdominal
pain. She was sent home and returned six days later with a palpable inflamed mass in her
abdomen. Rather than arrange for an immediate ultrasound examination at a local hospital, Dr.
Pegram scheduled her patient for an ultrasound at a facility staffed by Carle even though it would
entail a one-week delay and fifty mile trip. Before that ultrasound was administered, Mrs.
Herdrich's appendix ruptured, causing acute peritonitis and a week-long stay in the hospital. At
trial, ERISA's preemption of her state fraud count led her to reframe her claim under ERISA's
fiduciary requirements. Id. at 215-16.
167. Id. at 219.
168. Id. at 229.
169. Id. at 237.
170. Id. at 219. The Court noted that managed care's cost control techniques evolved in direct
response to the fee-for-service incentive and stated that the check on any system of financial
incentives is "the professional obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of
skill and judgment in the patient's interest." Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association as
amicus curiae 17-21).
171. Id. at 221.
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only the legislature, not the courts, can make the complex policy choices in
setting appropriate tradeoff levels of risks and costs. 172 Further, ERISA does not
support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against an HMO acting through its
treating physicians where the physician's "eligibility decision and the treatment
decision were inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical
administrative decisions every day." 173
The Pegram Court clarified that, under ERISA, an HMO is not an employee
welfare benefit plan; rather, the plan is embodied by the agreement between the
HMO and the employer by which the employer agrees to pay premiums and
the parties establish "rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care." 174
Under ERISA, an HMO can only breach a fiduciary duty if acting as a plan
fiduciary.175
Consequently, financial incentives that place a physician's
economic self-interest in reducing care at odds with his patient's need for
services do not necessarily constitute a breach of fiduciary responsibilities
under ERISA.
An HMO can make: 1) "pure eligibility decisions turn[ing] on the plan's
coverage of a particular condition or medical procedure for its treatment;" 176 or
2) pure treatment decisions, entailing choices about the appropriate medical
response in terms of diagnosis and treatment "given a patient's constellation of
symptoms .... "177 However, the Court emphasized that HMOs can wear two
hats at a time with different categories of decisions becoming "practically
inextricable from one another" 178 forming a third category of mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions. In the Court's view, pure eligibility decisions involve
"fiduciary administrative functions" that Congress intended to be subject to
section 502 civil enforcement provisions for breach of fiduciary obligation. 179 In
contrast, pure treatment decisions as well as mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions resemble typical physician treatment decisions. The Court doubted
that Congress intended these to be actionable as fiduciary claims, especially
given
Congress's preoccupation with pension plan funding and
180
mismanagement when it enacted ERISA.
Uncertainty regarding Congress's preemptive intent should have been
enough to resolve the issue given the strong presumption against preemption

172. Id.
173. Id. at 229.
174. Id. at 223. An ERISA fiduciary "must be someone acting in the capacity of manager,
administrator, or financial adviser" to such a plan. Id. at 222. An HMO can become an ERISA
fiduciary if it administers the plan, i.e., the agreement between the employer and the HMO to
finance and deliver health benefits to employee plan participants and their beneficiaries. Id. at 223.
175. Id. at 226 (observing that since ERISA does not dictate the creation or design of benefits
plans, an employer's decisions about either "are not themselves fiduciary acts") (citing Lockheed
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) ("Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish
employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefit employers must provide if
they choose to have such a plan.")).
176. Id. at 228.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 232.
180. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, 5 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-383,17 (1973)).

20101

DrawingLines in Shifting Sands

demanded by Travelers.181 Here, however, any doubt regarding Congress'
intent to exclude mixed decisions from administrative fiduciary ones "hardens
into conviction" because an ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duties would
merely duplicate "the law already available in state courts and federal diversity
actions today.... "182 As a result, an HMO's mixed eligibility and treatment
decision cannot be challenged under ERISA as a breach of fiduciary
obligation.183

As a straightforward request for section 502 remedies, Pegram was not a
preemption case per se although it occurred because sections 502 and 514 had
preempted so many state remedies despite Travelers' return to traditional
preemption analysis. 184 While Pegram ruled for the HMO, its rationale held
great promise for patients since reading it together with the Travelers trilogy
and Boggs suggested that mixed treatment-eligibility decisions should be
actionable under state tort law. 185 However, any such hope for plaintiffs was
dashed by Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, which actually found for the
186
patient but incentivized plans to self insure in order to evade state liability.
1
87
And in 2004's Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, Pegram's early patient-protective
implications evaporated entirely, leaving both patients and state legislators
with a severe case of judicial vertigo.
Rush Prudentialv. Moran involved Illinois' statutory requirement of external
review for managed care coverage denials based on medical necessity
determinations.18 As he had in Pegram, Justice Souter wrote for the majority,
and explained that although the additional layer of review related to employee
benefit plans, 189 it was saved from section 514 preemption as a state insurance

181. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 232.
183. Id. at 237. The Pegram Court concluded its opinion with a stinging attack on plaintiff,
finding that this was actually a much easier call than Travelers:
To be sure, [Travelers] throws some cold water on the preemption theory; there,
we held that, in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state regulation,
there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of congressional
purpose. But in that case the convergence of state and federal law was not so
clear as in the situation we are positing; the state-law standard had not been
subsumed by the standard to be applied under ERISA. We could struggle with
this problem, but first it is well to ask, again, what would be gained by opening
the federal courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly
random fortuities such as more favorable scheduling, or the ancillary
opportunity to seek attorney's fees. And again, we know that Congress had no
such haphazard boons in prospect when it defined the ERISA fiduciary, nor
such a risk to the efficiency of federal courts as a new fiduciary malpractice
jurisdiction would pose in welcoming such unheard-of fiduciary litigation.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 83-98, 118 and accompanying text.
186. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
187. 542 U.S. 200 (2004); see infra note 21027 and accompanying text.
188. 536 U.S. at 362 (addressing the Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.,
125, §§ 4-10 (2000). Having obtained a favorable external review, plaintiff sued her HMO to
reimburse her for the previously denied $95,000 microneurolysis surgery.).
189. Id. at 365.
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measure. 190 The defense argued that HMOs are health care providers, not
insurers, 191 but the Court disagreed, describing an HMO as "both: it provides
health care, and it does so as an insurer." 192 Further, the federal 1973 HMO
Act's text and legislative history showed that Congress has always
conceptualized HMOs as performing the essential insurance functions of
spreading and bearing risk. 193 Ensuing changes in managed care products and
risk transfer methods will not prevent states from regulating HMOs in their
traditional oversight of the insurance industry. 94 The Court also clarified that
since the three McCarron-Ferguson criteria used to determine savings clause
protection 195 were only "guideposts," a state law could be saved without
197
satisfying all of them. 196 The Illinois law met at least tWo.
The HMO countered that even if saved under section 514, the law could
still be completely preempted by section 502 for disrupting ERISA's goal of
uniformity and creating enforcement mechanisms not included in section 502's
civil remedies scheme. 198 This argument failed since the external review
requirement applied to the HMO - not the plan contracting with the HMO and created the kind of indirect economic costs permitted by Travelers.99
Therefore, given no clear indicia of Congress' preemptive intent, the state
statute survived both section 514 and section 502 preemption. 200 Writing for the
four dissenters, Justice Thomas stated that Travelers, a section 514 case, should
not impede section 502 preemption from ensuring the "exclusivity and
uniformity of ERISA's enforcement scheme[.]" 201 Here, section 502 should
preempt the Illinois measure because it created a "separate vehicle to assert a
20 2
claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA's remedial scheme."
Still, Rush was a clear "win" for patients and states, even though it incentivized
plans to self-insure in order to avoid section 514's "saved" state insurance
regulation.
For a short while, it looked as if the Supreme Court might stay the
restrictive preemption course regarding managed care when it unanimously
found Kentucky's any-willing-provider law to be saved from section 514's

190. Id. at 373.
191. Id. at 366.
192. Id. at 367.
193. Id. at 368 (citing Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 § 1301(c), 87 Stat. 916,
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c) (1994); S. REP. No. 93-129, at 14 (1973)).
194. Id. at 370-371. That today HMOs typically try to shift risk to the provider through capitation
or other means did not dissuade the Court from this result. Id. at 372-73 (observing "that HMOs are
not traditional 'indemnity' insurers is no matter; we would not undertake to freeze the concepts of
'insurance' . . . into the mold they fitted when these Federal Acts were passed[,]") (quoting SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959)).
195. Id. at 373.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 373-75.
198. Id. at 385-87.
199. Id. at 381, n.11.
200. Id. at 387 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985)).
201. Id. at 393-94(Thomas, J.dissenting)
202. Id. at 401.
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"relate to" preemption in Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans v. Miller.2 3 Since the
1985 case of Metropolitan Life Insur. Co. v. Massachusetts,204 the McCarronFerguson Act's three-part test for defining insurance had dictated the limits of
section 514's savings clause protection for state insurance regulation. In Rush
20 5
Prudential, the Court had downgraded the requirements to "guideposts."
Now, it acknowledged that importing McCarron-Ferguson criteria into ERISA
law had "misdirected attention, failed to provide clear guidance to lower
federal courts, and, as this case demonstrates, added little to the relevant
analysis." 206 For this reason, it announced a "clean break," and stated that to be
saved from section 514's "relate to" preemption, a state law "must be
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance [and] must
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the
insured." 20 7 The Kentucky statute did both and therefore was saved because it
(1) targeted HMOs which, at least in certain respects, act as insurers; and (2)
affected risk pooling by effectively precluding HMOs from using closed
20 8
networks in exchange for lower premiums.
Coming just a year after Rush Prudential's rejection of a section 502
challenge to state regulation of managed care practices, Kentucky Health
continued to respect the role of state law in overseeing health care. However,
any enthusiasm on the part of states, providers and patients was extinguished
when the ground shifted yet again in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila.2 9 What was
not yet apparent in Rush was that Justice Thomas's pro-section 502 preemption
dissent would prevail in 2004's Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.210 Moreover, by
upending ERISA jurisprudence once again, the Court would imperil state law
and thus leave patients and providers with few remedies for managed care
practices that were likely to become even more hard-line if shielded from state
law. And that is precisely what occurred in the aftermath of Davila.

203. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
204. 471 U.S. 724 (1984).
205. 536 U.S. at 373.
206. Ky. Ass'n. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339-40 (2002).
207. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 338-39.
209. 542 U.S. 200 (2004). In hindsight, though, signs of a shift away from protecting patients
appeared before both Rush Prudential(2002) and Kentucky Health (2003) and just a year after Pegram
in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), a non-health benefits case, involving a section 514
preemption challenge to a Washington statute requiring the automatic revocation upon divorce of a
spouse's designation as a beneficiary of a non-probate asset. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(A)
(1994). The decedent died two months after divorcing his second wife, having never changed his
designation of her as the beneficiary of the employment pension plan, and his children sued to
recover the pension proceeds. The ex-wife argued that the statute was section 514 preempted and
the Court agreed, finding an "impermissible connection [between state law and] ERISA plans"
because the statute "binds plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining
beneficiary status." 532 U.S. at 147. An additional "prohibited connection" resulted since the state
rule affected claims processing and payment and thus disrupted Congress's goal of ensuring
nationally uniform plan administration. Id. at 148. Although the state law fell within an area
traditionally left to state regulation, the presumption against preemption yielded to clear indicia of
Congress's intolerance for binding plan choices. Id. at 151-152.
210. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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Stage 6: Back to the Playbook: A Return to Broad Preemption Brings a Return to
Managed Care Games
Since state regulation of managed care had survived ERISA preemption in
Travelers through Kentucky Health, Texas appeared to be on firm ground in 1994
when it enacted its Health Care Liability Act to allow MCOs to be sued for
negligent medical necessity determinations. 211 The law did not mandate
coverage of any particular benefits, but simply directed MCOs to exercise
ordinary care in "making health care treatment decisions," and imposed
liability for harm proximately resulting from the breach of ordinary care. 212
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila consolidated two cases in which ERISA plan
beneficiaries claimed their HMOs violated the statute by failing to exercise due
care, one by denying coverage for a certain medication, and the other by
denying an extension of inpatient benefits. 213 Each patient initially complied
with the MCO's decision and claimed to have sustained physical harm as a
result.214 Relying on the "indistinguishable" 215 precedent of Pegram, the Fifth
Circuit viewed both suits as challenging non-fiduciary, mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions under traditional and, as such, non-502 preempted state
law. 216 As a result, it lacked removal jurisdiction and remanded to the state
court. It did note, however, that the medical aspects of the MCOs' actions
signaled that a section 514 defense was unlikely to succeed. This was the same
court that had found just the opposite in Corcoran,but here, it explained that its
earlier ruling had since been "undermine[d]" by the Travelers trilogy's
"curtail[ment]" of the scope of section 514 preemption 217 as well as Pegram's
dicta suggesting no section 502 preemption of medical malpractice claims
2
against an MCO. 18

A unanimous Supreme Court saw things quite differently.
Having
authored Rush's 4-justice dissent, Justice Thomas now spoke for all 9 in
invoking ERISA's "extraordinary
preemptive
power,"219 "expansive
preemption provisions" 220 and "substantive regulatory requirements" 221 which
showed that Congress had carefully balanced various remedies in forbidding
compensatory damages under both section 502 and, through preemption, state

211. Texas Health Care Liability Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West
2004 Supp. Pamphlet) [hereinafter THCLA].
212. Davila, 542 U.S. at 212 (citing THLCA § 88.002).

213. Id. at 204.
214. Id. at 204-05. Specifically, Mr. Davila had an adverse drug reaction, resulting in
hospitalization while Mrs. Calad experienced post-surgical complications that necessitated rehospitalization.
215. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2002).
216. Id. at 315.

217. Id. at 314.
218. Id. at 315.
219. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987)).
220. Id. at 208.

221. Id.
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law, too. 222 As a result, section 502 completely preempts state law challenges to
medical necessity decisions because they qualify as claims for benefits. Even
state laws that are saved from section 514 "relate to" preemption and do not
replicate section 502 causes of action are section 502 preempted because they
interfere with plan administration.22 3 The Court's holding was a stunning
change in direction, not only because it effectively left injured patients with no
meaningful relief, but also because the Court unanimously overlooked or at
least underplayed its recent ERISA rulings.
Gone was Pegram's implicit endorsement of at least some state remedies
where (as in Davila) the plan had delivered covered health care benefits, but the
health care itself had fallen short of what was medically necessary. 224
Moreover, notwithstanding Justice Thomas's reliance on ERISA's "substantive"
requirements, the law in general and section 502 in particular say nothing about
such circumstances. If anything, the absence of such provisions shows that in
1974, when managed care was in its infancy, Congress never intended to
displace longstanding state tort remedies, especially in the traditionally statecontrolled health care quality context. Any doubt about congressional intent
should yield to Travelers' presumption against preemption given no clear
indication that Congress silently deprived patients of meaningful remedies
simply because they receive health benefits through an ERISA plan. 22
As a result, traditional rules of statutory construction as well as the Court's
own precedent argued against preemption of state law, especially where section
502 equitable relief does nothing for a patient who has already sustained injury
following an MCO's failure to exercise due care in making medical necessity
determinations. Yet, the Davila Court unanimously decided otherwise because
here, the MCOs' decisions were actionable under section 502 unlike the nonsection 502 mixed eligibility-treatment determinations in Pegram.226 Pegram had
focused on the content of the MCO's decision, emphasizing that a medical
necessity determination blends medical and administrative choices, which are
not readily uncoupled. 227 According to Davila, though, what really mattered in
Pegram was not the nature of the HMO's decision, but the nature of the HMO
making the decision. 2
Pegram involved an HMO that was owned and operated by the same
physician who provided care; accordingly, she could dictate the timing and
location of an ultrasound without breaching the plan's fiduciary duties because

222. Id. at 209.
223. To do so "would 'elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade' the pre-emptive
scope of ERISA simply by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortuous breach of contract."
Id. at 214 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)).
224. See supranote 185 and accompanying text.
225. Senators Kennedy, McCain and others made exactly this point in their amicus brief for
Respondent. 2002 U.S. Briefs 1845 at *5; 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 68 at *'10 ("In enacting ERISA,
Congress believed it was providing a series of federal pension rights to workers and their families.
Its focus was entirely on establishing new minimum protections, not eliminating a wide swath of
long-standing traditional state protections.").
226. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218 (2004).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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she simultaneously acted as plan administrator and health care provider. In
contrast, the Davila UR nurse's determination of the timing and location of postsurgical care was a purely administrative, non-medical, eligibility decision
because the nurse was not a direct provider even though she effectively
supplanted the treating physician's treatment protocol with her own. 229 That
such a "benefits determination is infused with medical judgments does not alter
this result." 230 Under ERISA, an aggrieved patient may seek equitable relief by
filing a section 502 claim for breach of fiduciary duties. 231 With Davila, then, the
decision-maker - rather than the decision itself - dictates available remedies,
with no guarantee that any of those remedies will provide meaningful relief.
Consequently, in the unanimous view of our nation's highest court, a
patient in severe pain, incapacitated by an acute health crisis, and most likely
unaccompanied by legal counsel, should simply have paid for the extended
stay or initiated complex - and expensive - litigation from her hospital bed.
That hospitals often condition admission on proof of insurance coverage
seemed irrelevant to the Court. In addition, even if the patient could pay the
hospital costs up front, she would face the additional cost of retaining legal
counsel to sue the plan since section 502's solely equitable relief precludes a
contingent fee. Seeking a preliminary injunction to compel payment for the
treatment would be equally impractical. Few healthy individuals, let alone
those debilitated by illness, could shoulder the legal and financial challenges of
mounting a Rule 65 challenge. And as a practical matter, post-harm equitable
relief is typically worthless. Recognizing just how real and insurmountable
these challenges are led one federal appellate judge to sum it up as follows:
"[tjo the extent that participants are unable to seek an injunction compelling
coverage, ERISA's remedial scheme is almost entirely illusory." 232 So much for
ERISA's protection of plan participants and preservation of traditional state
oversight of healthcare.
The years since Davila's return to broad section 502 preemption show a
return to aggressive managed care tactics, especially when it comes to
preemption challenges of provider reimbursement claims. ERISA's shifting
impact on provider payment suits reflects the Supreme Court's changing
messages about ERISA's preemptive scope as well as varying opinions about
the provider's status as an assignee of a patient's health benefits. Some courts
have found that a provider can only collect if it has obtained a duly executed
assignment of benefits from the patient, while others reason that such
assignments have no effect since they are barred by the plan's contract with the
beneficiary. Still others have held that because assignee claims derive from,
and therefore "relate to" an ERISA benefits plan, the provider is limited to
section 502's equitable remedies which may bar monetary relief, leaving the
provider with no effective remedy. 233

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 218-19 (analogizing the fiduciary to a trustee of a medical trust).
Id.
Id. at 220-21.
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,459 (3d Cir. 2003).
Hobbs v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. 276 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Before Travelers, broad section 514 preemption often-but, as usual,
inconsistently -preempted an array of provider claims for reimbursement. In
1991, the Sixth Circuit in Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp. 234 ruled that
section 514 and section 502 preempted the hospital's state law claims 235
although the provider "could assert [a derivative section 502] claim as a
'beneficiary' of an employee benefit plan if it has received a valid assignment of
benefits."236 Otherwise, as neither a plan participant nor fiduciary, the hospital
had no independent standing to seek section 502 remedies and thus no way to
collect for services rendered. 237 This prompted the dissent to observe:
[Tihis procedure is emblematic of what seems to be an overzealous
readiness in the federal courts to bar all state-law claims which even
smell of ERISA under the broad umbrella of preemption without
engaging in the complex case-by-case analysis which the statute and
precedent require. As in this case, the result of such a boiler-plate
unreflective approach to ERISA preemption is to frequently leave
23
deserving claimants without recourse in state or federal court. 8
In Memorial Hospital v. Northbrook, the hospital obtained the plan's verbal
authorization before rendering care, but when the plan realized that the patient
was not covered, it refused to pay. 239 The plan argued that it acted as a
fiduciary administering ERISA benefits, a hospital cannot become an assignee
of those benefits, and section 514 preempts any challenge to its payment
decisions. 240 Working through the "preemption thicket," 241 the court agreed
with regard to the state claims for negligent misrepresentation, equitable
estoppel, and breach of contract since these were brought as an assignee and
thus derived from the patient's right to benefits, and the patient in this case was
not covered. 242 However, section 514 did not preempt the state statutory claim
for unfair insurance practices (specifically, negligent misrepresentation of
coverage) since it was not, as the plan had argued, "a derivative claim for
benefits." 243 Moreover, the court stressed that although ERISA preemption may
leave patients with no meaningful remedies, 244 leaving health care providers

234. 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991).
235. "Appellants filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
negligence and breach of good faith based on their reasonable reliance on Equicor's oral assurances
of coverage." Id. at 1275.
236. Id. at 1278.
237. Id.; accord Riverside Med. Assocs. v. Humana, Inc., No. 06-61490-CIV-COHN, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93739 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2006).
238. Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1279 (Jones, J., dissenting).
239. 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990).
240. Id. at 247-48.
241. Id. at 248.
242. As an early preemption case, it is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit had no problem with
the case's initial removal from state to the federal district court based on section 514 preemption. Id.
at 243.
243. Id. at 247.
244. Id. at 248 (acknowledging that it had "held under different circumstances that ERISA
preemption may occur even though ERISA itself could not offer an aggrieved employee a remedy
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with none could not be tolerated because:
If providers have no recourse under either ERISA or state law in
situations such as the one sub judice (where there is no coverage under
the express terms of the plan, but a provider has relied on assurances
that there is such coverage), providers will be understandably
reluctant to accept the risk of non-payment, and may require up-front
payment by beneficiaries -or impose other inconveniences -before
treatment will be offered. This does not serve, but rather directly
defeats, the purpose of Congress [to protect employees and their
245
beneficiaries] in enacting ERISA.
ERISA challenges to provider reimbursement claims seemed to wane after
Travelers appeared to limit section 514 preemption's usefulness in evading
liability. But since Davila's return to broad section 502 preemption, payers are
increasingly resisting or delaying payment, and raising both complete and
"relate to" challenges when sued for reimbursement. For example, in 2007's
Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v. Aetna Health Inc., a hospital brought contract, tort
and statutory claims against an HMO for failure to make prompt payment.246
The case involved the same jurisdiction as Northbrook as well as the same state
insurance statute, but unlike Northbrook, benefits were clearly covered and
payment was due within forty-five days of billing. 247 The defendant relied on
section 502 to remove the case; although this strategy failed, it did succeed in
subjecting the hospital to additional delays and costs in recouping the $1.2
million owed for treating the patient.248
In Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. v. Rapides Healthcare System, a
payer refused to honor assignments of plan benefits to two hospitals on the
ground that section 502 and section 514 preempted the Louisiana state
assignment statute. 249 The Fifth Circuit found no "relate to" preemption
because, unlike the Texas HMO liability statute in Davila, the Louisiana law
made no mention of ERISA plans, imposed no obligations on them, and created
no alternative remedies. 250 The plan's obligations would be the same regardless
of who brought that claim since the assignment statute "merely passes the sole
enforcement mechanism-ERISA section 502-from patient to hospital." 251
Despite so much Supreme Court "guidance" by this point, the Fifth Circuit still

for alleged misrepresentations. That principle should not be extended, however, to encompass
third-party providers ....
").
245. Id. at 247-248. The Fifth Circuit's explicit concern for congressional intent to protect plan
participants is impressive but remarkable since this was entirely absent from its decision in Corcoran
to deny relief to the parents whose pregnancy ended when their plan substituted its own fetal
monitoring regimen for that of the treating specialist. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
246. CIVIL ACTION H-06-00828, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42126 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2007).
247. Id. at *2-3.
248. Id. at '4345 (asserting section 502 complete preemption as the basis for federal removal
jurisdiction).
249. 461 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2010 (2008).
250. LouisianaHealth Serv., 461 F.3d at 534-35.
251. Id. at 536.

2010]

Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands

struggled and acknowledged that its own decision directly conflicted with
those of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which had found preemption of state
assignment statutes. 252 Its strongest basis for rejecting a similar approach was
that those cases were decided before the Travelers Court's return to "a
traditional analysis of preemption," and, thus, had erroneously failed to employ
the starting presumption in favor of upholding traditional state law.253
What the court did not mention, however, is that post-Travelers courts had
also found section 514 to preempt state assignment statutes. The First Circuit
did so with regard to Puerto Rico's statute in City of Hope National Medical
Center v. Healthplus, Inc., reasoning that section 514 prevents a state from
restricting the ability of the plan to enforce a non-assignment provision in a
benefits contract since Congress intended it to be negotiated by the parties. 254
The problem with this is that neither the patient nor the provider had any say in
the negotiations, which effectively deprived them of any meaningful remedies.
Plus, as Mem'l Hermann Hosp. and La. Health Serv. show, even when a provider
wins the preemption argument, it still faces additional delays and costs of
having to sue for payment. 25
Thus, that providers routinely obtain
assignments of ERISA health benefits does not mean that they will routinely
obtain prompt payment. And, as long as some courts find for some MCOs in
some cases, ERISA preemption defenses, along with the litigation costs of
opposing it, will continue. What will also continue is that state law will not
fulfill an essential function of allowing actors to predict the legal consequences
of their actions as well as the conduct of others.
Stage 7: ERISA Calls a Foul on State "Play or Pay" Mandates
After several decades of increasingly nuanced and unpredictable ERISA
rulings, patients, providers and states are justifiably frustrated. And, as the
complexity of ERISA disputes has grown, so too have health care expenditures
and the ranks of the uninsured. These developments are not entirely unrelated.
Rather, given congressional intransigence, states are increasingly taking the
lead in health care reform, especially with regard to expanding coverage. While
any state reform effort will encounter political opposition, ERISA presents a
much more difficult obstacle. Maryland learned this the hard way in the first
case of what will surely be the next wave of ERISA preemption litigation: Retail
56
Industrial Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder.2
Facing annual Medicaid costs of $5 billion and budgetary shortfalls
exceeding $100 million, Maryland enacted its employer "Fair Share Act" in

252. Id. at 540 (citing St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d
1460 (10th Cir. 1995); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir.
1991)).
253. Id. at 540.
254. 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir. 1998).
255. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v. Aetna Health Inc., CIVIL ACTION H-06-00828, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 42126, at *3, "18 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2007).
256. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2006).
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2006.257 Although facially neutral, the law basically targeted Wal-Mart, which
employed 16,000 workers in Maryland, (many of whom had no or inadequate
coverage) by requiring employers of 10,000 or more to devote at least eight
percent of their total payrolls to employees' health care or health insurance
costs. An employer could satisfy this obligation through direct benefits
payments or paying the difference between current spending and eight percent
to the state's Medicaid fund. 258
Wal-Mart did not challenge the law, but the Retail Industry Leaders
Association (RILA) did, characterizing this "fair share" measure as a section 514
preempted employer mandate. Maryland countered that it was a generally
applicable revenue statue like the one that survived section 514 preemption in
Travelers.259 The court agreed with RILA, finding that the law effectively
mandated a minimum level of health benefits while impermissibly interfering
with plan administration through its reporting requirements. The threat of
inconsistent administrative burdens in violation of ERISA had already been
realized by similarly intended, but differing financial and reporting
requirements in Minnesota and New York's Suffolk County. Despite no
express reference to ERISA plans, Maryland's Fair Share law inevitably created
260
a connection with the plan that triggered "relate to" preemption.
RILA also succeeded in dismantling Suffolk County's fair share ordinance
in Retail Industrial Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County.261 With reporting obligations
that mirrored Maryland's, the "Suffolk County Fair Share for Health Care
Act" 262 directed large, non-unionized retailers to meet an annual "public health
263
care cost rate" in health care spending for each full or part-time employee.
As in Fielder, the ordinance's payment alternatives did not obviate the need to
restructure plans in violation of section 514.264
Massachusetts' 2006 "Act to Control Costs and Improve Quality" took a
much broader approach to health care reform, using a blend of insurance
market reforms,

265

individual mandates 266 and

achieve universal coverage by

2009.267

employer "incentives"

to

Critical to the Massachusetts' plan's

257. Id. at 199; Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 MD.CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to
-107 (2009).
258. Fielder,475 F.3d at 183.
259. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
261. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
262. SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAW §§ 325-1-7 (2005).
263. Retail Indus. Leaders v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 406 '3-5, 15.
264. Id. at 418.
265. Among these is the newly created "Commonwealth Connector," which assists individuals
and small businesses of fewer than 50 employees to find suitable private plans and promote
consumer driven competition.
266. To date, the greatest criticism of the individual mandate is that it may not be economically
sustainable since it is feared that premiums will be too high for the insured, too low for the insurer
and therefore require too much in the way of state subsidies.
267. Act § 15 (adding M.G.L.MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E § 9A (West 2008)); see also Tim
Murphy, The Massachusetts Health Plan: How Did They Do It?, 5-6 (Remarks at Alliance for Health
Reform
Conference,
May
8,
2006)
at
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/050806_Transcript-mass-164.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
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success are the law's "play or pay" or "fair share" requirements that employers
with more than 10 full-time workers make a "reasonable contribution" to their
employee health care. This can be accomplished by covering at least twentyfive percent of the workforce, paying at least a third of the cost of all workers'
individual plans, or making the annual "fair share" contribution, which, in
2008, was $295 per full-time worker. 268 In addition, employers of ten or more
full and/or part time employees must offer Internal Revenue Code section 125
"cafeteria plans" to enable workers to use pre-tax dollars in paying for
coverage. 269 Failure to offer section 125 plans triggers significant "free rider"
penalties to fund uncompensated care sought by that employer's workers on
270
five or more occasions.
Early supporters of the fair share "incentives" included two of the state's
largest health insurers - Blue Cross Blue Shield and Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care-which would benefit from higher enrollments and employer
contributions. 271 Yet, some criticize the incentives for effectively reducing
and/or taxing individual wages, 272 and unduly incentivizing small to medium
sized businesses to leave the state. 273 A competing concern is that an annual
fair share contribution of just a few hundred dollars per worker is so low that it
will entice employers currently offering health benefits to drop coverage. 274
Within Massachusetts itself, the law's chief promoters and detractors have
paid scant attention to the shadow of ERISA preemption. Clearly, the design of
the law reflects a conscious attempt to circumvent preemption. The focus on
fostering consumer driven competition in insurance markets and the reliance
upon individual mandates make the statute at least appear to be more ERISA
friendly than the Maryland and Suffolk County efforts to target "big box"

2010).
268. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 188. (West 2008).
269. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151F (West 2008); THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
THE

COMMONWEALTH

CONNECTOR:

EMPLOYER

HANDBOOK

8,

https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.C
ontentDeliveryServlet/FindInsurance/Employer/Overview/Employer% 2520Handbook.pdf2009.
270. The actual penalties will range from ten percent to one hundred percent of the cost of the
services. Robert Moffit & Nina Owcharenko, Understanding Key Parts of the Massachusetts Health
Plan
(Heritage
Found.,
Web
Memo
No.
1045,
2006)
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm1045.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). Because
§ 125 plans permit pre-tax, employee contributions, they may offer savings of up to forty percent of
each dollar contributed. They also enable the employer to save approximately $160 in annual
federal withholding tax for each participating employee, although it costs about $100 per year per
employee to create and administer a health-only cafeteria plan and several national companies
compete for this business.
USE
OF
"CAFETERIA

RICHARD CAUCHI, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES'
PLANS"
TO
PROVIDE
HEALTH
INSURANCE
(2009)
at

http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14515 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
271. Jeffrey Krasner, Business Leaders Suggest Health Law Too Easy on Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2,
2007, at C1.
272. Nina Owcharenko & Robert Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for the States
(Heritage
Found.,
Backgrounder
No.
1953,
2006),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1953.cfm.
273. Id.
274. Krasner, supra note 270. To forestall such a result, one bill has already been submitted that
would compel companies to pay for at least 50% of individual premiums. S.661, 185th Mass. Gen.
Court, (Mass. 2007).
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retailers. If anything, the statute might be even more vulnerable than its
Maryland counterpart to a section 514 "relate to" challenge. First, by applying
to all employers with ten or more workers and imposing more requirements, it
risks antagonizing far more employers than just Wal-Mart. Second, although
the IRS does not categorize section 125 plans as ERISA plans, their compulsory
inclusion in a benefits package might be problematic under section 514 given
their attendant costs and administrative adjustments for affected employers. 275
Third, the annual fair share contribution might be viewed as an employer
mandate and/or interference with plan administration amounting to a section
514 preempted "connection" with a plan. In this regard, the statute's
establishment of the Commonwealth "Connector" seems a most unfortunate
choice of terminology. The state would argue that this measure simply creates
options, not a mandate, and that any payments make the law a funding
measure with the kind of indirect economic impact that evaded section 514
preemption in Travelers. Given that this argument failed in both Fielder and
Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk County, it is not clear whether the law would
survive. So far, however, there has been no ERISA challenge, although this is
likely due to the extraordinary efforts to build political consensus during the
law's design and enactment instead of the lack of any vulnerability in the
statute itself. A similar approach was taken by Vermont's 2006 reform
initiative, which requires employers with uninsured workers to make a
quarterly "Health Care Premium Contribution" of $1 per day for each full time
equivalent employee. 276 Like that of Massachusetts, Vermont's mandatory
employer contribution has not provoked an ERISA preemption challenge
despite its inherent vulnerability.
That state "fair share" or "play or pay" measures will inspire the same
judicial inconsistency as past stages of ERISA preemption litigation became
clear in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City of San Francisco.277 Unlike
Fielder's and Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk County's findings of section 514
"relate to" preemption, the Ninth Circuit upheld the employer spending
requirements of San Francisco's "Health Care Security Ordinance." 278 The
ordinance applies to for profit employers doing business in the city and

275. See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., EMPLOYER CAFETERIA PLANS 2

(2008), http://www.chcf.org/documents/insurance/EmployerCafeteriaPlans.pdf. ("[B]ecause the
definition of employer group health coverage is different under ERISA than under the federal tax
code, as long as employers do not endorse or promote specific individually purchased health
insurance policies, [§ 125 plans] should not be subject to ERISA. Nor should a state requirement
that employers offer Section 125 plans be preempted by ERISA."). However, the National
Conference of State Legislatures points out that "states still cannot regulate 'self-insured' health
plans sponsored by many large employers. Drafters need to recognize that care is needed to avoid
a challenge to any broader law." CAUCHI, supra note 304.
276. Under Vermont's 2006 Health Care Affordability Act, which took effect on April 1, 2007, a
quarterly assessment is due if the employer does not cover all employees or has uninsured
employees. The law permitted an exemption for up to a specified number of full time equivalent
employees. Up to eight full time equivalent employees may be exempted for fiscal years 2007 and
2008, six in 2009, and four in 2010. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2002(5), 2003(a) (2007).
277. 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3691 (U.S. Jun. 5, 2009) ( No.
08-1515).
278. Id. at 642 (citing S.F. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a) (2007)).
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averaging twenty "covered" employees per quarter and to nonprofit employers
that average fifty. 279 Each quarter, these employers must make "required health
care expenditures" 280 determined by multiplying the total number of hours
paid for each covered worker by "the applicable health care expenditure
rate." 28 1 Employers must keep, and provide the City with reasonable access to
"accurate records of health care expenditures, required health care
expenditures, and proof of such expenditures made each quarter each year." 282
Failure to abide by the recordkeeping provisions raises a presumption of
nonpayment, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 283
Under certain circumstances, self-funded plans must meet the spending
requirement, although there is no need to "keep track of their actual
expenditures for each employee."284
Given its requirement of quarterly payments based on each worker's hours,
shifting health care expenditure rates, and quarterly records of those payments,
San Francisco's initiative seems even more administratively intrusive than the
preempted fair share measures of Fielder and Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk
County. Plus, the potential for multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations
clearly exists since Maryland, Suffolk County and Massachusetts have all used
different "play or pay" rules. Consequently, the federal district court found
section 514 preemption, 285 but the Ninth Circuit reversed because the payment
options provided "a legitimate alternative to establishing or altering ERISA
plans" since the employer or at least the employee stood to gain from whatever
way the employer chose to meet its fair share obligation. 28 6 As a result, the
ordinance only exerted the kind of indirect economic impact that survived
287
section 514 preemption in Travelers.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit found no conflict with the Fourth Circuit's
Fielder ruling because of the Maryland law's lack of any quid pro quo for fair

279. As defined by § 14.1(b)(2), "covered employees" (1) work in the City, (2) work at least ten
hours per week, (3) have worked for the employer for at least ninety days, and (4) are not otherwise
excluded from coverage under the Ordinance.
280. Id. at §§ 14.1(b)(3), (11), (12).
281. S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.3(a), 14.1(b)(8). At the time of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the per
employee health care expenditure was $1.17 per hour for for-profit employers with twenty to
ninety-nine employees and non-profit employers with fifty or more employees, and $1.76 per hour
for for-profit employers with 100 or more workers. Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644, (citing San
Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement Reg. 5.2(A) (2007)). Reg. 5.2(A) (2007) [hereinafter
ESR] (implementing the employer spending requirements of the San Francisco Health Care Security
ordinance).
282. Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at Id. at 645 ("but it does not require them 'to maintain such records in
any particular form."') (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b)(1)).
283. Id. at 645 (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b)(ii)).
284. "An employer providing 'health coverage to some or all of its covered employees through a
self-funded/self-insured plan 'will' comply with the spending requirement . .. if the preceding
year's average expenditure rate per employee meets or exceeds the applicable expenditure rate' for
the employer." Id. (citing ESR Reg. 6.2(B)(2)).
285. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County o of San Francisco, 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979-80
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (entering summary judgment for Restaurant Association and enjoining
implementation of Ordinance's ordinance's employer spending requirements).
286. Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 660.
287. Id.
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share payments to the state effectively left employers with only one "rational
choice," i.e., "to structure their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the
Unmentioned was that an employer and
minimum spending threshold." 2
even an employee might want to forego any "quos" in order to avoid the
ordinance's administrative and economic costs. For this reason, it is not at all
clear that other courts would find Golden Gate and Fielderso easy to reconcile.
Fielder and Golden Gate demonstrate how cash-strapped states cannot count
on the courts to free them of the binds of ERISA preemption as they tackle
health care reform. By July 2009, however, financial need had already trumped
any reservations about legal ambiguity in the three states that enacted universal
coverage initiatives, and an additional fourteen that have attempted or are at
least considering similar measures. 28 9 As occurred in Maryland, Massachusetts,
San Francisco and Suffolk County New York, fair share contributions 290 and
required section 125 cafeteria plans are common strategies for expanding
291
coverage while promoting affordability.
Nevertheless, as Fielder, Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk County and Golden
Gate reveal, the long-term viability of play of pay provisions are far from certain
if courts are left to interpret sections 502 and 514 with no input from Congress.
Although plaintiffs have petitioned for certiorari in Golden Gate, there is no need
to await the outcome to know that the instability of the Supreme Court's
preemption jurisprudence will persist. Although not an ERISA case, its 2009
ruling in Wyeth v. Levine made it abundantly clear that inconsistency and
292
unpredictability are all that can be expected when it comes to preemption.
Most striking is the concurrence of Justice Thomas, whose insistence on
restrictive preemption is nothing short of bewildering given that his Pegram
293
dissent fueled the Court's return to broad section 502 preemption in Davila.
Wyeth concerned a successful state law product liability claim against a
pharmaceutical manufacturer for its failure to provide adequate labeling
regarding the risks of "IV push" administration of the drug Phenergan. 294 Since
the FDA had approved the original label and subsequent revisions, Wyeth
argued that the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act preempted state common law
claims. 295 The state courts disagreed 296 and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court

288. Id. (quoting Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007)).
289. As summarized in a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, universal coverage measures
have been enacted in Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont and have been considered in California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, STATES
(2009),
HEALTH
CARE
REFORM
TOWARD
COMPREHENSIVE
MOVING
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/State-Health-Reforml.pdf.
290. See supra notes 257-268 and accompanying text.
291. Section 125 plans are now required in Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island, optional and under consideration in Colorado and New York. See supra note 264;
RICHARD CAUCHI, States' Use of "Cafeteria Plans" to Provide Health Insurance, NCSL (May 2009)
availableat http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14515 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
292. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
293. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
294. Id.
295. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 (et. seq.) [hereinafter "FDCA"].
296. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d. 179, 186-194 (Vt. 2006).
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did, too. Employing the kind of traditional preemption analysis used in
Travelers,297 the Wyeth majority 298 characterized congressional purpose as "the
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case" 299 and emphasized that
[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has 'legislated... in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,' ... we 'start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
300
Congress.'
That drug labeling had been subject to federal oversight for over a century
did not alter this result since "Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law
30
causes of action." 1

Although the federal statute at issue contained a preemption clause, it did
not expressly preempt state tort claims. This lack of preemption, coupled with
Congress's "certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation" was
"powerful evidence" that it never intended to preclude patients from asserting
30 2
tort claims to challenge the safety of a drug or the adequacy of its labeling.
Consequently, neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations preempted the patient's
common law claims. 303
Ironically, ERISA, like the FDCA, has an express preemption clause in
section 514 that says nothing about state tort claims. Plus, both drug safety and
health care are encompassed by traditional state authority, with tort remedies
enjoying longstanding prominence in protecting individuals. Notwithstanding
these glaring parallels, the Wyeth majority's use of a 1992 Travelers-like
rationale, after moving so far away from it in Davila in 2004 is not just ironic; it
is baffling.
Nowhere is the Court's blithe inconsistency more astonishing than in
Justice Thomas's concurrence. After all, when he dissented in Pegram and
wrote for a unanimous court in Davila, he favored preemption due to ERISA's
extraordinary preemptive power, 30 4 "expansive preemption provisions" 305 and

297. See supranote 74 and accompanying text.
298. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer and Kennedy.
Justice Thomas concurred, but only in the result. 129 S.Ct. at 1190.
299. Id. at 1194 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted from original) and Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96,103 (1963)).
300. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
301. Id. at 1195, n. 3 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
302. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1200. To underscore this point, the majority quoted the unanimous
decision of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989), which
explained that "[tlhe case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has
indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has
nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them." (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1204.
304. Davila,542 U.S. at 207 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, at 65-66 (1987)).
305. Id. at 208.
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"substantive regulatory requirements." 30 6

That these operate in an area of
traditional state law without expressly preempting common law claims or
permitting comparable relief did nothing to dissuade him from finding that
Congress implicitly intended to preempt state tort claims arising out of medical
necessity decisions. 307 In Wyeth, though, he refused to join with the majority
not because they had erred by finding no preemption, but because they had not
gone far enough in deferring to state law!
Justice Thomas explained that he had become "increasingly skeptical" of
"far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines" that focus on congressional
purpose and unconstitutionally "wander from the statutory text." 308 Even
though he had similarly wandered in both Pegram and Davila, he did not
hesitate in chastising Wyeth's majority as well as the dissent for straying from
the statute's explicit text especially because text embodies legislative
compromise. 3 9 In his view, "our federal system in general, and the Supremacy
Clause in particular, accords pre-emptive effect to only those policies that are
actually authorized by and effectuated through the statutory text." 310 Thomas
argued that the FDCA's failure expressly to preempt state tort law was
therefore dispositive; and that the majority should not have started with a
presumption against preemption and then looked to the text and its overall
purpose for evidence of a preemptive intent. 311
Dissenting, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia,
agreed that a starting presumption against preemption was unnecessary where
conflict preemption is alleged. 312 However, Congress's objectives still mattered
because "the ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption turn solely on whether
a State has upset the regulatory balance struck by the federal agency." 313 Upon
examining the FDCA's purpose, five justices found that Congress never
intended to preempt state tort claims and three concluded that preemption was
needed to fulfill Congress's choice of the FDA as the sole arbiter of drug
safety.314

Although Wyeth is not an ERISA case, it could and - if the Court is at all
consistent (which obviously, it has not been) - should complicate ERISA
preemption. Should the Supreme Court review Golden Gate, it will surely

306. Id.
307. See supra notes 187-226 and accompanying text.
308. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 1216.
310. Id.
311. Id. "Certainly, the absence of a statutory provision pre-empting all state tort suits related to
approved federal drug labels is pertinent to a finding that such lawsuits are not pre-empted. But the
relevance is in the fact that no statute explicitly pre-empts the lawsuits, and not in any inferences
that the Court may draw from congressional silence about the motivations or policies underlying
Congress' failure to act. (Thomas, J.)"
312. Id. at 1229, n. 14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 1220.
314. In his dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, Justice Alito
observed "[t]hus, it is not true that 'this Court has long' applied a presumption against pre-emption
in conflict pre-emption cases." Id. at 1229, n. 14 (quoting the majority's earlier statement at 1195, n.
3).
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discuss the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's competing views of ERISA preemption
of state fair share requirements. Davila's broad view of preemption suggests
that the Fourth Circuit's position will prevail and the Court will find the San
Francisco ordinance to be preempted and probably do so on both section 514
and section 502 grounds. But Wyeth could throw a wrench into the Court's
approach. According to Justices Thomas, Roberts, Scalia and Alito in Wyeth,
Travelers' strong presumption against preemption should be used sparingly if at
all, which would increase the likelihood of preemption. Yet the remaining five
justices along with Justice Thomas would view the lack of ERISA's express
preemption of state law, coupled with Congress's awareness of the operation of
state tort law in a traditional area of state concern as militating against
preemption. This could make preemption less likely. As it has for over thirty
years, then, the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption precedents predict nothing
more than a coin flip. Consequently, instead of relying on stare decisis, or
standing firm over time, 315 litigants - particularly states - should prepare for
dejicere decisis316 as the Supreme Court continues to shake, rattle and roll
through these cases.

c. Overtime: If That Was Then and This is Now, What Comes Next?
Whether Congress fulfills President Obama's demand for "health insurance
reform," achieves his earlier goal of broader "health care" reform, or does
nothing at all, it must finally clarify: 1) the appropriate scope of ERISA
preemption, and 2) the availability of ERISA and state remedies. Without such
clarification, ERISA preemption will still bedevil patients seeking compensation
for medically necessary care that comes too late or not at all. 317 It will continue
to ensnare providers seeking pre-authorization and ultimate payment as well as
obstruct interstitial state action, particularly when it comes to the kind of state
and local innovations to expand access that occurred in Maryland,
Massachusetts, and elsewhere. That Congress needs to release state law from
the confusion of ERISA's text and judicial interpretation thereof is nothing new;
to date, however, the federal response has been sporadic and disappointing.
When the House of Representatives returned to Democratic control in
January 2007, "The Health Partnership Through Creative Federalism Act" was

315. "Stare" has been defined as to "stand, stand still, stand firm; remain, rest .. " See Whitakers
Words, http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/wordz.pl?keyword=stare (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
316. "Dejicere" has been defined as to "throw/pour/jump/send/put/push/force/knock/bring
down; cause to fall/drop; hang" - an apt description of how the Supreme Court has done anything
but stand firm in its handling of ERISA preemption cases. See Whitaker's Words,
http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/wordz.pl?english=jump: (last visited Oct 21, 2009).
317. Section 132 of H.R. 3200 requires internal and binding external review, including expedited
reviews of urgent claims. Hopefully, this will reduce the number of Corcoran- and Danca-like
tragedies, but it will certainly not eradicate them since, as demonstrated in the state medical
malpractice context, juries regularly award relief despite a finding of no liability by pre-trial
screening panels. H.R. 3200, 11th Cong. (2009). The House bill does not address this problem other
than § 151's statement that § 514 of ERISA remains in effect. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 151 (2009); 29
U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
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introduced to encourage health reform at the state level. 318 During hearings in
May of 2007, representatives of the National Business Coalition on Health, the
American Benefits Council, and "The ERISA Industry Committee", among
others, testified to the adverse effects of liberalizing ERISA waivers. An
attorney who represents large employers and the ERISA Industry
Committee, 319 identified four reasons for preserving the status quo: (1)
Preemption is needed to permit innovations that will continue and build upon
the success of employer based health care; (2) "Congress carefully considered
the effect of ERISA preemption on state health reform efforts more than 30
years ago, when ERISA was enacted" and "concluded that preemption was
necessary to eliminate the threat of conflicting state and local regulation of
employee benefit plans"; 320 (3) Unlike, for example, Medicaid waivers, granting
ERISA waivers would be too complicated since no waiver, approval process
currently exists; and (4) "[Sjtates do not need ERISA waivers" to accomplish
needed reforms since problems such as "insuring the unemployed, providing
reliable and accessible information on health care cost and quality, making
affordable insurance available to individuals and small groups - are outside the
321
scope of ERISA's preemption provisions."
That an advocate for large employer interests sought to preserve
preemption came as no surprise. What is so troubling, however, is that the
grounds asserted were not just self-interested, but also inaccurate or at least
naive. First, many employers have made admirable efforts to bring better
coverage to greater numbers at lower costs, but this should not entitle them to
free - and sole - rein in deciding how patients and providers are treated or how
the uninsured and state payers are affected. Second, as demonstrated by 35
years of section 502 and section 514 litigation, Congress did not consider
preemption's impact on "state health care reform" when it passed ERISA. It
focused instead on pension plan reform and paid little attention to the full
ramifications of preemption for a managed care industry that was in its infancy
during the 1970's. That the federal HMO Act contemporaneously required
employers to offer HMO plans is just one of many indicia that health plan
accountability was simply not on the congressional radar. Third, arguing that
waivers are too complicated because there is no system in place is akin to
arguing in the 1930's that income taxes could never be levied since there was no
system in place. The idea simply makes no sense, especially with the Medicaid
waiver program as a ready analogue to put an ERISA waiver process in place.
Fourth, the problems of improving quality and expanding coverage which are
described as "outside the scope" of ERISA preemption 322 have ironically been

318. GovTrack.us.,
H.R.506
[110],
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bll=h110-506 (last visited Oct. 26, 2007) (providing for
innovation in health care through State initiatives that expand coverage and access).
319. Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal and State Initiatives
Before the Subcomm. On Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. On Education and
Labor, 110th Cong. 39-40 (2007) (statement of Amy N. Moore, Covington & Burling LLP).
320. Id. at 3.
321. Id.
322. Id.

2010]

DrawingLines in Shifting Sands

placed within that scope by large employers seeking to evade state oversight
and defeat state health care reform initiatives. As demonstrated by patients,
providers and states during three decades of legislative and judicial wrangling,
ERISA preemption has presented huge obstacles to everyone but employers. In
this regard, state officials from Montana, Maryland, and New Jersey testified to
the many and varied reform efforts that have been blocked by ERISA
323
preemption, particularly with respect to self-funded plans.
In 2007, ERISA waivers may have been the most that could be hoped for
given Congress's longstanding resistance to wide scale health reform.
However, when President Obama took office, things looked quite different.
After all, Massachusetts had already seen more than 400,000 formerly
uninsured persons obtain coverage 324 with employers remaining in-state and in
the business of insuring their workers. 325 During the first half of 2009, such
promise, combined with economic recession, relentless cost escalation, and
326
rising unemployment adding to the nation's 47 million of uninsured
generated broad political and public consensus that the time had come to
327
accomplish comprehensive reform at the national level.

http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/helpO52207.shtml
323. Id. at III.
324. In its May 2009 quarterly report on Health Care in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts
Division of Health Care and Finance and Policy reported an increase of 428,000 people in private or
subsidized health care plans (excluding Medicare beneficiaries) since the state's reforms took effect
in June, 2006. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE AND FIN. POLICY, HEALTH CARE INMASSACHUSETTS: KEY
at
available
(2009),
3
INDICATORS
http:/ /www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/09/KeyindicatorsMay_09.pdf.
325. In its December 2008 analysis of 2007 employer survey data, the Massachusetts Department
of Health Care Finance and Policy indicates that rates of employer sponsored health benefits have
remained stable in Massachusetts following implementation of state reform, while national
employer sponsored coverage rates have declined. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE AND FIN. POLICY,
at
available
(2008)
4
2007
SURVEY
EMPLOYER
MASSACHUSETTS

See also
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/08/employer -report_2007.ppt.
Sharon K. Long & Paul B. Masi, How Have Employers Responded To Health Reform In Massachusetts?
Employees' Views At The End Of One Year, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS w576, W576 (2008) (employee survey
results confirm that employers made no significant changes in coverage following enactment of
state health reform).
326. See, e.g., Todd P. Gilmer and & Richard G. Kronick, "Hard Times and Health Insurance: How
Many Americans Will be Uninsured by 2010?" 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS AFF. w-573 (web exclusive 2009)
(predicting that, absent major changes in current policy, the number of uninsured in America will
grow by 6.9 million just due to higher coverage costs (increasing from 17.2% in 2007 to 19.2% - or
52 million - by 2010) with "more millions" losing coverage due to job losses).
327. See, e.g., KRISTOF STREMKIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE OPINION LEADERS' VIEWS ON PRIORITIES FOR

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ("The Commonwealth Fund/Modem Healthcare Health Care
Opinion Leaders Survey: Views on Priorities for the Obama Administration, January 2009,"
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Surveys/2008/The-Commonwealth-Fund(last
Modem-Healthcare-Health-Care-Opinin-Leaders-Survey-Views-on-Priorities-for.aspx
visited Oct. 26, 2009) (a survey of 194 "[p]eer-nominated experts in health care policy, finance, and
delivery; select members of the Modem Healthcare database" suggests that "President Obama
enjoys a strong mandate for major elements of the health care reform proposal unveiled during the
2008 presidential campaign.")); Jim Cooper and & Michael Castle, "Health Reform: A Bipartisan
View," 28 HEALTH AFF.AIRS w-169 (web exclusive March 2009) ("Political and policy factors suggest
that President-elect Barack Obama is in a much better position than his predecessors to achieve
comprehensive health reform, including universal coverage.); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Taps
Clinton Ideas but Not Clinton Herself, N.Y. TIMES, 19, (Mar. 5, 2009) ("Experts say the political climate
for passing major health care changes is more favorable than ever, with business leaders,
pharmaceutical and hospital executives, insurance officials and advocates for patients all agreeing
the need is urgent.").
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Not surprisingly, however, political consensus quickly splintered in the
face of the devil in the details of expanding coverage and controlling costs
while preserving if not improving quality. Unlike President Clinton who
charged his wife with chairing a task force to design a complex and ultimately
failed proposal, 328 President Obama articulated eight guidelines for
'comprehensive health reform," 329 but put Congress in charge of the
logistics. 33 0 In a year when the economy continues to stumble and all 435
members of the House and one third of 100 Senators are up for reelection, there
is little appetite for hitting voters in their wallets. Consequently, even
Democrats have resisted President Obama's initial idea of imposing a broadbased income tax on employer sponsored health benefits 331 or a more limited
tax on the affluent 332 to fund reform. Requiring individuals to have insurance
has also gained little traction even though the Congressional Budget Office lists
"enforceable individual mandates" as necessary for achieving universal
coverage. 333 And the President's idea of creating a public plan to compete with
private payers was at one point described by Senator Grassley (Republican,
Iowa) as "a deal breaker for Republicans if it's in, and.., a deal breaker for
Democrats if it's not[.]" 334 With members of Congress launching new

328. See generally The Politics Of Health Reform: A Collection Of Perspectives, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS
688 (2008); Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 9 (1994).

329. The Administration's initial goals for "comprehensive health reform" were to: 1) reduce costs;
2) protect against health-care related bankruptcy; 3) guarantee choice of providers and plans; 4)
promote prevention and wellness; 5) improve the safety and quality of care; 6) "assure affordable,
quality care for all Americans"; 7) ensure portability of coverage; 8) end pre-existing conditions
exclusions. WHITE HOUSE, Health Care, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/health-care/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009) (emphasis added).
330. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Congress is Left to Flesh Out the Details, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, at
A4 (discussing the President's "unusual approach" of "laying out the big picture, and letting
lawmakers fill in critical details"); Robert Pear, Obama's Health Plan, Ambitious in Any Economy, Is
Tougher in This One, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2009, at 14.
331. See, e.g., Carrie Budoff Brown & Chris Frates, Harry Reid Jumps Into Health Negotiations,
POLITIcO.cOM, July 7, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24676.html (noting
participants in the Senate were having "second thoughts about taxing health benefits, which would
raise $340 billion over 10 years" but revealed as "highly unpopular" in public polling); Key Senate
Panel Struggles
To
Reach
Consensus, KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS,
July
20,
2009,
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2009/July/20/Senate-Monday.aspx; House Faceoff
Looms Over Sweeping Health Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS,
July
20, 2009,
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2009/July/20/Monday-House.aspx.
332. Alex Wayne & Jonathan Allen, Blue Dogs Bare Teeth at Health Bill Markup, WASHINGTON
HEALTH

POLICY

WEEK

IN

REvIEW,

July

20,

2009,

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-inReview/2009/Jul/July-20-2009/Blue-Dogs-Bare-Teeth-at-Health-Bill-Markup.aspx
(describing
Democratic opposition to H.R. 3200's funding provisions2009).
333. ROBERT A. SUNSHINE,

PRESENTATION TO CONGRESSIONAL HEALTH STAFF: CBO's NEW

HEALTH
REPORTS,
10
(December
2008),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/SlidesHealthBriefing.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,2009);
see also, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS, 1

(December 2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-Keylssues.pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
334. Drew Armstrong, Grassley Says Public Insurance Option Is Thorniest Health Care Issue,
WASHINGTON
HEALTH
POLICY
WEEK
IN
REVIEW
(Mar.
19,
2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-inReview/2009/Mar/Washington-Health-Policy-Week-in-Review-March-23-2009/Grassley-Says-
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proposals, attacks and counter-attacks each day, it is becoming increasingly
clear that federal action, if any, will be scaled back from the comprehensive
reform that finally seemed within reach when President Obama assumed office.
Nevertheless, even broad-based reform will not completely erase ERISA
preemption's detrimental impact on the large majority of patients and
providers who deal with employer-sponsored health care. Congress might
very well follow Massachusetts' lead and require individuals to obtain
coverage, and also mandate employers to "play or pay" in covering their
workers (the latter of which is vulnerable to ERISA preemption when required
by states). 335 Congress may insist that certain benefits be offered, and put an
end to various exclusions - measures that, if mandated by states, would be
preempted when applied to employer-sponsored plans, especially those that
are self-insured. Such actions would expand coverage, improve access and
maybe even contain costs.
However, none would do a thing to protect patients from falling into
ERISA's remedial vacuum for harms resulting from MCO medical necessity
determinations for employer sponsored plans. None would help providers
who rendered care but need to overcome costly ERISA barriers to payment. In
addition, none would help states whose traditional role in overseeing health
care would likely be viewed as more fragmented and muddled than ever.
Reform should not only bring change, it should bring improvement even if only
through clarification of roles, rights and remedies of the various players. It is
fair to say that, at least so far, the outlook is less than promising.
Perhaps the sole point of agreement among the President and his
opponents is their determination to avoid "the preemption thicket" 336 by
leaving both state remedies and sections 502 and 514 intact. 337 For instance,
section 132 of "The Affordable Health Choices Act" that passed in the House
and the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee in July 2009
provides for internal and external review of coverage and medical necessity
disputes. Ideally, a provision of this kind could reduce the kinds of injuries that
occurred in CorcoranB38 and Danca339 discussed above. Still, state law remains
intact unless otherwise provided although "[n]othing... shall be construed as
affecting the application of section 514 of [ERISA]." On its face, preserving state
law seems reasonable except for the sad fact that, once a patient has been
injured, ERISA preempts state law remedies, and ERISA's equitable remedies

Public-Insurance-Option-Is-Thomiest-Health-Care-Issue.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
335. See supra notes 267 and 274, and accompanying text.
336. Memorial Hospital v. Northbrook, 904 F.2d 236, 2448 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed supra note
222.
337. For instance, in the H.R. 3200 "Affordable Health Choices Act," § 151(a)(1) states that,
unless otherwise provided, the requirements of the overall Act "do not supercede... [ERISA], or
State law" subject to § 151(a)(2)'s qualification that "[n]othing in [§ 151(a)(1)] shall be construed as
affecting the application of section 514 of [ERISA]." H.R.3200, 111th Cong. § 151(a)(1) (2009) available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c111:l:./temp/clllMnq9NO:e62784: (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
338. See supra notes 61 and 71, and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 134 and 139, and accompanying text.
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are futile post-injury. 340
The 107th Congress came close to filling the ERISA vacuum when it was
scheduled to debate and vote on the "Bipartisan Patient Protection Act" 341
following its August 2001 recess. The major sticking point was whether
patients would be able to recover compensatory damages for harm proximately
resulting from MCO medical necessity determinations or other benefit denials
or delays. Coming shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Pegram decision and
before that Court's hairpin turn in Rush, the Senate's more generous version
was seen as "basically following the approach suggested by Pegram, allowing
state courts to apply traditional malpractice norms to claims that unreasonable
medical decisions by MCOs have contributed to death or disability." 342 Despite
a general consensus that some version of the bill would pass, it was not at all
clear whether patients would have better remedies.
What soon became clear was that no part of the bill could survive the
September 11, 2001 attacks. At that point, matters of national security became
all consuming, patients' rights toppled from the legislature's agenda and, as
described earlier, Pegram'spromise of available state remedies evaporated with
Davila's resuscitation of broad ERISA preemption. 343 It has taken eight years for
health care to reemerge as a domestic priority, but fixing ERISA preemption is
no longer on the legislative wish-list. Yet, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's
post-Pegram preemption decisions of Davila and Wyeth, the ERISA preemption
thicket is more confounding than ever.
Like too many aspects of health care in America today, the preemption of
remedies problem is getting worse, not better, and not just for patients, but - as
explained above-for providers and states, too. If nothing is done to fill
ERISA's remedial vacuum, and employers are mandated or incentivized to
expand health benefits, more patients will be covered by ERISA-qualified
health benefits plans. As a result, more patients will have no meaningful
remedy after sustaining harm due to an MCO's decision. This could also mean
that more health care providers, already struggling with declining
reimbursement rates, will need to spend valuable time challenging treatment
denials and, after rendering care, face more difficulty in getting paid. And all
of this will be the direct result of the continuing ability of MCOs to invoke
section 502 and section 514 preemption to evade accountability to patients and
providers alike.
It may be a harsh reality, but it is reality nonetheless to say that Congress
needs to reform ERISA preemption or liberalize the availability of state ERISA
waivers. It could fix ERISA by clarifying the scope of preemption with regard to
the kinds of coverage and medical necessity decisions that result from the
integration of finance and delivery of health care. It must state explicitly
whether state compensatory remedies are available. If state remedies are not

340.
341.
342.
ETHICS
343.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
S.1052 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
Sylvia A. Law, Do We Still Need a Federal Patients' Bill of Rights?, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
1, 310 (2002).
See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
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available, it must include them in ERISA itself by amending section 502's civil
enforcement scheme.
It is far more likely, however, that overt ERISA reform will prove
impractical due to the need to conserve political capital at a time of
unprecedented challenges at home and abroad and a deepening divide over
whether and how to undertake federal health care reform. For this reason,
Congress should look to ERISA waivers as critical to any next step. If
comprehensive federal reform collapses in whole or significant part, allowing
state experimentation will offer the best promise for figuring out how to fix the
health care system since it is broken in so many places and in so many ways.
Waivers would also allow much needed flexibility since what might work for
one state or region may not be suited to the economy or geography of
another-a realization that will not be new to Congress since it granted a
waiver to Hawaii when it initially passed ERISA.344 And finally, waivers would
allow states to do what federal law currently does not: accord some form of
protection to both patient and provider as Congress fights its way to more
comprehensive reforms.
III. CONCLUSION
President Obama had hoped that the weeks leading up to August 2009's
congressional recess would be marked by consensus, compromise, and ultimate
passage of a health reform bill. Unfortunately, consensus was displaced by
conflict, compromise ceded to impasse, and civil discourse among a bipartisan
Congress devolved to increasingly strident dissent. In mid-July, Senator Jim
Demint (Republican - S.C.) assured the group "Conservatives for Patient
Rights" that "this health care issue is D-Day for freedom in America" and "if
we're able to stop Obama on this it will be his Waterloo. It will break him."345
A few days later, President Obama responded:
This isn't about me. This isn't about politics. This is about a health
care system - a health care system that is breaking America's families,
breaking America's businesses and breaking America's economy, and
we can't afford the politics of delay and defeat when it comes to
healthcare - not this time, not now. There are too many lives and
livelihoods at stake. There are too many families who will be crushed
if insurance premiums continue to rise three times as fast as wages.
There are too many businesses that will be forced to shed workers,
scale back benefits, or drop coverage unless we get spiraling health

344. See, e.g., John Colmers supra note 318, at 28 (statement of John Comers, Secretary, Maryland
Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene).
345. Ben Smith, Health Reform Foes Plan Obama's 'Waterloo', POLMCO.COM, (July 17 2009,)
available
at
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0709/Health-reform-foes plan-Obamas-Waterloo.ht
ml?showall (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
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346

It is true that lives and livelihoods are at stake. Perhaps it should not be
about politics, but in this country, it is all about politics when it comes to
making policy, and it is all about the intricacies of legislation when it comes to
putting policy into practice. It is true that there is much to be done to fix health
care in America, and improving the "Four Cs" of "coverage, cost control,
coordinated care, and choice" is undoubtedly essential. 347 Not unrelated,
however, is the way in which ERISA - an employee protective statute - has
been wielded by payers to avoid accountability, and erratically interpreted by
the courts to permit if not promote this absurd result. Health care reform
without ERISA preemption reform or waivers runs the risk of leaving patients
with no remedies and providers with no pay. It also curtails the ability of states
to do much about it. All of these concerns are troubling, but the latter is surely
the most disturbing. After all, it is understandable if Congress's plate is too full
to take this on, but it is unforgiveable if Congress will not allow the states to try.
On March 21, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872 which will initiate insurance reforms,
individual mandates and employer "play or pay" incentives. Although
subsequent amendments are expected, section 251(a) currently permits a state
to seek an ERISA waiver for the purpose of implementing a single payer
system. Otherwise, ERISA preemption, along with its complexities and
problems, remains intact and is likely to grow more confounding for states,
providers, and patients as the new law takes effect.

346. Huma Khan & Jonathan Karl, Dems Waver on Obama's August Health Care Deadline, ABC
NEwS ouly 21, 2009) available at http://www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8134131&page=1
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
347. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

